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Nations in the Asia-Pacific region are modernizing their naval fleets, and many 
are choosing to use submarines as the centerpiece of these plans. China, one of the most 
influential nations in the region, has upgraded its submarine force, and it is important to 
analyze the impact this modernization effort will have on the stability of the region. India, 
Japan, and the United States are closely watching the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s 
(PLAN’s) submarine force to understand better China’s intentions writ large, and the 
implications they have for security. All three nations have reacted in response to the 
PLAN’s modernization goal. This thesis concludes that the most effective policy going 
forward would be a balanced combination of both hard and soft hedging (including 
dialogue with the PLAN) to defend allied security interests but also to provide avenues 
for promoting future regional stability.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In recent years, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has 
developed its submarine force with its nuclear-powered attack (SSN) Type 093 (Shang-
class) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Type 094 (Jin-class) 
submarines. Discussions have also transpired regarding follow-on SSBNs (Type 095) and 
attack submarines (Type 096).1
 
Other recent improvements the Chinese have made to 
their fleet include a recent purchase of diesel-electric Kilo-class submarines from Russia, 
increases in its domestically produced diesel-electric inventory, and employment of 
advanced long-range and short-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), both subsonic 
and supersonic.2 China will increase the capacity of its SSBNs through the ability to 
carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which creates the potential 
for a nuclear second-strike capability.3 Finally, the PLAN has added air-independent 
propulsion technology to its diesel-electric submarines that greatly increases their 
operational range and allows them to perform ultra-quiet operations.4  
Historically, the Chinese submarine fleet mainly has operated within the first 
island chain, an area encompassed by the East and South China Sea. With all these 
upgrades, PLAN submarines now possess the capability to deploy outside the second 
island chain, to include the Pacific and Indian Ocean, which increases their operational 
range.5 The Chinese submarine fleet may be used to protect assets, such as shipping 
vessels, as China claims, but other nations may not view the PLAN’s undersea 
                                                 
1 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 18–19, http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_ 
Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf. 
2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2014), 7–8. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, 19. 
5 Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background 
an Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33153) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2010), 5. 
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advancements in the same light. Some may see China’s recent modernization as 
threatening. To evaluate these perspectives, it is necessary to examine other nations’ 
maritime and naval strategies. 
Given the PLAN submarine modernization, what exactly are the threat perceptions 
emerging from its force as seen by India, Japan, and the United States? Additionally, how 
can these nations bolster their submarine capabilities and strategies to counter the Chinese 
undersea threat? This thesis examines the modernization of the Chinese submarine fleet 
through these two lenses and asks these questions: How do these three nations interpret the 
PLAN’s submarine advancements and how are they responding to them? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the end of the Cold War, China has been slowly building its forces, 
specifically, the PLAN. The Chinese seem to be building their submarine fleet to patrol 
areas much farther past their own coastline and waterways, which will allow them to 
compete in the undersea domain. India, Japan, and the United States already have 
undersea forces operating in this area of the region. Peter Howarth writes in China’s 
Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge, “Since the collapse of Soviet 
naval power, China has become the operator of the world’s largest tactical submarine 
fleet.”6 In addition to possessing a large fleet, the PLAN has also been rapidly 
modernizing its submarine fleet. With regard to the submarine fleet of the PLAN, as 
compared to its other naval vessels, China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force, a 
collection of naval insights on the PLAN, states, “It is now widely recognized that 
submarines are the centerpiece of China’s current naval strategy.”7 This thesis 
investigates the submarine fleet’s potential threat and why India, Japan, and the United 
States are concerned over this modernization. This study has implications for future naval 
policy in regard to anti-submarine warfare and locations of conflict due to the presence of 
the PLAN submarine force. 
                                                 
6 Peter Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), i. 
7 Andrew S. Erickson et al., ed., China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2007), x.  
 3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chinese literature is limited when discussing plans and intentions of the PLAN 
submarine force with regard to the capabilities its submarines provide the nation. This 
literature review covers three topics. First, it provides a definition for the term “modern 
submarine fleet.” Second, it addresses what advancements the PLAN has made to its 
submarine fleet in recent years. Third, it examines defense reports and journal articles 
from India, Japan, and the United States, and analyzes the threat as perceived by these 
nations.  
1. Defining a Modernized Submarine Fleet 
A modernized submarine fleet has certain characteristics that distinguish it from a 
non-modernized fleet. A modern fleet consists of submarines that possess greater 
capacity to remain undetected and that have the ability to inflict greater harm to an 
adversary than a non-modern fleet. According to Jesse Karotkin, a senior intelligence 
officer for the China Office of Naval Intelligence, modern submarines have the ability to 
employ anti-cruise ship missiles or submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic 
missiles.8 For the purpose of this literature review and thesis, the definition of a modern 
submarine fleet will have a larger scope to include enhanced quieting technologies, such 
as air-independent propulsion, and the ability to employ anti-cruise ship missiles, 
advanced torpedoes, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.  
2. The PLAN Submarine Modernization 
The PLAN has recently added technological improvements to its submarine force 
and shows no sign of slowing down. Its advancements can be divided into several 
categories: quantity, power projection, and sea patrol range. The capacity of its 
submarine force has increased tremendously in the last 10 years, and by 2015, 70 percent 
of its approximately 60 submarines should be modernized.9 The PLAN’s newest type of 
                                                 
8 China’s Military Modernization and its Implications for the United States, Before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 113th Cong., 8 (2014) (statement of Jesse Karotkin, Senior 
Intelligence Officer for China Office of Naval Intelligence). 
9 China’s Military Modernization and its Implications for the United States, Before the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, 8. 
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nuclear-powered SSBN, the Jin-class, is operational and it currently has three in service, 
although it still lacks a missile (despite the Defense Intelligence Agency’s repeated 
prediction that it would be operational for the past five years).10 China’s capacity to 
operate in the undersea domain has increased with its large quantity of modern 
submarines.  
The power projection capability of a submarine depends on the weapons carried 
by the submarine and its ability to use the weapons. The Jin-class SSBNs are intended to 
carry the JL-2 SLBM, with a range of 7,400 kilometers.11 Reports have concluded that 
the PLAN has achieved a successful launch of the JL-2 from the Jin-class but has yet to 
deploy.12 Once this accomplishment occurs, the PLAN will greatly improve its ability to 
achieve a second-strike nuclear capability. The SSBN’s ability to remain covert and to 
avoid antisubmarine warfare, though, will still remain in question. In addition to nuclear 
weapons, China received advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) from Russia, the 
SS-N-27 Sizzler, which are some of the most capable missiles that China owns.13 These 
can be launched from many of its hunter killer submarines (SSKs) and all of its SSNs. 
Sea patrol range for the PLAN has increased with its recent deployments to the 
Indian Ocean, when China deployed its SSN in an effort to increase its training and 
readiness and to evaluate its ability to protect vital sea-lanes of communication.14 China 
first began to increase its submarine operations between 2002 and 2004, when it launched 
13 submarines.15
 
The PLAN furthered its submarine capabilities with increased surface 
and submarine “combat readiness deployments” beginning in 2007 with six and then 
                                                 
10 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, 7. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, 
16. 
13 O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities-Background an 
Issues for Congress, 16. 
14 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 254. 
15 Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force: Insights from 
Chinese Writings,” Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 55. 
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adding an additional 28 in 2013.16 In 2014, Chinese officials announced that the PLAN 
conducted its first “combat readiness patrol” to the Indian Ocean that involved both 
surface ships and submarines.17 China is likely to continue to operate its submarines 
further away from its own coast to improve the tactical readiness of its fleet. 
3. Literature from India 
Studies that discuss how India regards the PLAN generally agree that a threat 
exists. Even though the two nations have been cooperating economically and politically, 
distrust still remains in the military realm. An examination of India’s Ministry of Defence 
Annual Reports reveals that every report since 1992 has mentioned China.18 Overall, the 
theme from the reports is that India wants to improve relations with China and that it has 
have been attempting this through joint military exercises and official diplomatic 
meetings. However, India does not fully trust China. India’s past three annual reports 
(2013–2014, 2012–2013, and 2011–2012) all have the phrase, “China is a major factor in 
India’s security calculus.”19 With this statement from India, what specifically threatens 
its security: land forces, air forces, surface naval forces, or a submarine force?  
Arun Prakash, former chief of naval staff of the Indian Navy, states, “China has 
undertaken an extensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal and now fields medium-
yield weapons, carried by longer-range and more accurate DF-21 and -31 land-based 
ballistic missiles, along with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.”20 Prakash 
acknowledges a threat from submarine-launched ballistic missiles and later details why 
the threat exists. He observes that the United States and China signed an agreement 
                                                 
16 “U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” 284–85, November 2014, www.uscc. 
gov.  
17 Ibid., 255. 
18 John Garver, “Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions,” Journal of Strategic Studies 
25, no. 4 (June 4, 2010): 110, doi:10.1080/01402390412331302885. 
19 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 2013–2014 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2014), 7, 
http://www.mod.nic.in/writereaddata/AnnualReport2013-14-ENG.pdf; Ministry of Defence, Annual 
Report, 2012–2013 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2013), 6; Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 
2011–2012 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2012), 6. 
20 Arun Prakash and Yang Yi, “Bridging Historical Nuclear Gaps,” in The China-India Nuclear 
Crossroads, ed. Lora Saalman (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua, 2012), 18. 
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known as the “non-targeting” agreement, where each nation would not target the other 
with nuclear weapons. Prakash argues that, “The biggest and perhaps most dangerous 
lacuna in this [Indo-Sino] relationship is the lack of an official dialogue on nuclear 
issues.”21 Prakash wishes for India and China to discuss their nuclear issue openly in the 
hopes that India could have an agreement like the one the United States has with China. 
Another Indian leader, Uday Bhaskar, a former commodore of the Indian Navy, is also 
concerned regarding nuclear weapons that the Chinese possess. He states, “The 
modernization of the Chinese arsenal draws much concern within India for its impact on 
the bilateral relationship.”22 Through defense reports and former Indian naval officers, it 
is clear that India perceives a threat from China with regard to its nuclear weapons.  
The threat in India not only stems from nuclear weapons. The two nations have a 
history of conflict, which has left some issues unresolved and highlights some critical 
uncertainties regarding the Sino-Indian relationship. An advanced submarine force adds 
another layer to the sources of conflict. A critical uncertainty is how China interacts with 
Indian neighbors, creating a complex situation. One nation that China has cooperated 
with recently is Sri Lanka. Jane’s Navy International reported online that the PLAN had 
submarine port calls to Colombo in Sri Lanka once in September 2014 and then again in 
November 2014.23 Indian Naval Commander Sibapada Rath argues that China’s actions 
are clear when he states, “The encirclement of India is evident through all sides of 
Chinese development.”24 China has also increased its military ties with Pakistan through 
a submarine deal that provides the Pakistan Navy with eight submarines to be fully 
operational by 2025.25  
                                                 
21 Ibid., 20. 
22 C. Uday Bhaskar and Hongyi Nie, “Comparing Nuclear Pledges and Practice,” in The China-India 
Nuclear Crossroads, ed. Lora Saalman (Washington, DC: Carnegie-Tsinghua, 2012), 37. 
23 C. Uday Bhaskar, “Strategic Sustainment? China’s Ships, Silk Roads, and Indian Ocean Presence,” 
Jane’s Navy International, November 13, 2014, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/ 
DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1728227&Pubabbrev=JNI. 
24 Sibapada Rath, “Maritime Strategy of India and China: Influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan,” Naval 
War College Journal (India) 26 (2014): 79. 
25 Farhan Bokhari, “China, Pakistan Set for Submarine Deal by End of Year, Say Officials,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly 51, no. 11 (February 5, 2014), http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/14939 
53453/abstract/EEC7C153EC334B70PQ/1. 
 7 
The PLAN is likely to have an increased presence in the region as it increases it 
deployments and port calls in the Indian Ocean, and relations with other nations 
surrounding the region. As China increases its ties with certain states, it may cause 
opposing states to rally together in an attempt to counter the Chinese presence. Indian 
analyst Sandip Kumar Mishra argues, “China’s growing maritime assertiveness in recent 
years appears to be counter-productive for Beijing, as it has led to an evolution of a 
broader network to deal with China.”26 It seems that India may broaden its relations, as it 
will not want to face China alone. 
4. Literature from Japan 
While India focuses on Chinese nuclear weapons, as well as unresolved issues of 
the past, the literature from Japan has identified that China poses as a long-term security 
threat with more aspects than just weapons. This section first examines Japanese Defense 
white papers, then National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and finally reports 
from National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Japan. Its white papers have 
identified eight major items themes regarding Chinese military affairs, four of which this 
review analyzes: defense policies, military transparency, national defense budget, and 
military posture as they relate to submarines.27 The first theme, defense policies, states, 
“China is believed to be strengthening its military forces with its top priority foremost in 
mind, namely, dealing with the Taiwan issue, more specifically, improving China’s 
capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for the 
independence of Taiwan.”28 Japan understands that it is not regarded as an immediate 
threat to China, but Japan recognizes a threat exists as China builds its strength and 
increases its capabilities. 
The second theme listed by the Japanese is the lack of military transparency by 
the PLAN. As the PLAN increases its military strength, China fails to reveal its vision for 
                                                 
26 Sandip Kumar Mishra, “China’s Maritime Assertiveness and Repercussions,” Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, December 7, 2015, http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/chinas-maritime-assertiveness-and-
repercussions-4940.html. 
27 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 33–46. 
28 Ibid., 33. 
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the military and the PLAN.29 An early example of Chinese lack of transparency occurred 
in 2004 when the PLAN navigated its nuclear-powered SSNs into Japanese territorial 
waters. The Asian Wall Street Journal described this incident as, “the most serious 
between the two Asian giants since World War II.”30 The PLAN conducts military 
activity without an explanation, and Japan claims that after these types of events, the 
Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are never truthful 
about the actual intent of the operations.31  
The third theme is China’s national defense budget, which has been steadily 
growing and has almost quadrupled in the last 10 years alone, according to Japan’s 
Ministry of Defense.32 China’s actual defense budget has not been officially released, but 
China even reports that the budget has increased by double digits every year since 
1989.33 Christopher Hughes writes that Japan has responded to China’s increase in 
submarine spending by procuring new anti-submarine warfare capable ships, helicopters, 
and P-3C patrol aircraft of its own.34 Also in response to Japan’s buildup, Jane’s Defense 
Weekly posted online, “The JMSDF is addressing concerns over China’s modernization 
of its submarines by increasing the force’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This 
includes efforts to grow the size of the submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats.”35 Japan is 
demonstrating that it will continue to fund antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to 
counter the PLAN. 
                                                 
29 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 34. 
30 Martin Fackler, “Japanese Pursuit of Chinese Sub Raises Tensions; Incident Was Most Serious 
Since World War as Two Vie For Sites in East China Sea,” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2004. 
31 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 34. 
32 Ibid., 35. 
33 U.S. Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Congress, 2014), 287. 
34 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Response to China’s Rise: Regional Engagement, Global 
Containment, Dangers of Collision,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 
85, no. 4 (2009): 845. 




The last item is military posture, which discusses China’s missiles, nuclear forces, 
and its naval operations. Japan states that China possesses a range of missiles from 
intercontinental to submarine-launched ballistic missiles.36 Japan believes that “China is 
working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, mounting 
warheads, and other means.”37 In addition, China is developing its JL-2 missile, and 
when it becomes operational, “China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a 
great margin.”38 China’s advancing missile technology, coupled with its submarine force, 
could be problematic for Japan. Japan, in response to Chinese modernization, states, “it is 
necessary to continue to monitor the development of the Chinese naval forces.”39 Japan 
perceives China to be a potential threat, as it witnesses more spending by the PLAN, and 
operations close to Japanese territory. Captain Takuya Shimodaira, the first Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) liaison officer assigned to the U.S. Naval War 
College as an International Fellow, describes the perceived Chinese threat: 
Japan is capable of assuming proportionate responsibility for the safety 
and security of the seas in the Asia-Pacific region. While China continues 
to expand its presence in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, a 
realistic approach for Japan involves the promotion of multiagency and 
multilateral cooperation in the maritime domain. Japan will protect its 
national interests through military and nonmilitary means, while pursuing 
a position of regional leadership.40  
Captain Shimodaira explains that the future does not involve maintaining the 
status quo. Japan will have to continue to bolster its own defenses, as well as strengthen 
its alliances. Chinese naval operations, as witnessed by Japan, have been building up to 
conduct operations in more distant waters. Japan has observed maritime exercises and 
monitoring activities, which were conducted to protect China’s maritime rights and 
interests. While China’s exercises have not entered into Japan’s territorial waters, Japan 
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warns that any intrusion would be perceived as, “dangerous act that could cause 
unintended consequences.”41 
In addition to Japan’s white papers, its National Defense Program guidelines offer 
another look into the Chinese threat. An examination into these reports reveals that in 
2010, Japan shifted its military strategy to respond to current threats. In its 2010 report, 
Japan states that it will abandon its “Basic Defense Force Concept” in lieu of a “Dynamic 
Defense Force,” which offers “readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and 
versatility.”42 In its NDPG released in 2013, Japan states that China is increasing its 
asymmetrical military capabilities, referring to the Chinese anti-access area denial 
(A2/AD) concept. This increase is problematic for Japan because of the lack of 
transparency by the Chinese military. Japan’s concern regarding China’s military 
capability, as it relates to regional and global security, are one reason it has shifted to a 
dynamic force.43 Japan’s Mid-Term Defense Program 2011–2015 (MTDP), which seeks 
to align the capabilities of the military to meet the standards set forth in the NDPG, 
highlights a plan to build up its maritime forces. A direct result of China’s modernization, 
the MTDP instructs Japan to strengthen its submarine and antisubmarine capabilities and 
to increase its missile defense to counter Chinese ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise 
missiles, and ASCMs.44 Japan views Chinese submarines as a threat, and with its 
increased spending on ASW, is attempting to counter the PLAN’s capabilities. 
Finally, literature from NIDS in Japan is analyzed. In its NIDS China Security 
Report 2011, the authors discuss their concern over the role that China’s growing 
submarine strength will play as part of its maritime strategy. One theory is that the PLAN 
will use A2/AD tactics to counter a force entering the first island chain by employing 
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anti-ship cruise missiles on its submarines.45 A second concern is how China will use its 
submarines to guarantee security of its sea lines of communication (SLOCS). Japan relies 
on maritime transport, and China’s submarines could have the ability to disrupt activity in 
the area.46 The third concern of NIDS is China’s future ability to operate without 
detection in waters around China because of a new submarine base on Hainan Island. 
NIDS believes that the base will be an underwater base and the PLAN would be able to 
launch a submarine without it being detected by other nations.47 
In addition to security concerns, Tomotaka Shoji argues in an NIDS article that 
Japan should continue to strengthen its relationship with the United States because the “U.S. 
Navy’s 7th Fleet is the only guarantor of security in the South China Sea” and China will 
unlikely accept the U.S. role in the region.48 Japan desires a stable region, and China, along 
with its military modernization, is undermining the capacity for stability from the Japanese 
perspective. 
5. Literature from the United States 
The literature from the United States regarding the PLAN and its submarine force 
is vast and detailed. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), like Japan, states that 
China’s main focus is preparing for a potential conflict regarding Taiwan. However, the 
DOD also reports that in addition to Taiwan, China is preparing for contingencies in the 
South and East China Seas and areas farther away from its coast to increase its sea lane 
security.49 The DOD’s annual report to Congress, formerly called “Military Power 
Report of the People’s Republic of China,” and now titled, “Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” from 2009–2014, never state 
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that the PLAN submarine fleet poses a direct threat to the United States. However, the 
reports indicate that the United States must be watchful in this region due to the 
uncertainty of the PLAN and its use of its submarine force. The DOD states in its 2014 
report, “China’s lack of transparency surrounding its growing military capabilities and 
strategic decision-making has led to increased concerns in the region about China’s 
intentions.”50 Threats from the PLAN submarine could be grouped into two categories. 
The first would include the capability to attack U.S. aircraft carriers. According to Roger 
Cliff’s prepared statement before Congress, the Chinese would attempt to attack a U.S. 
aircraft carrier in a Taiwan invasion scenario using torpedoes and submarine-launched 
anti-ship cruise missiles. He believes that it would be the most likely scenario for an 
armed conflict between China and the United States.51  
The second category would involve nuclear weapons carried onboard its 
submarines and the uncertainty of when the weapons would be used. Unlike the United 
States, China remains unclear on exact situations that would prompt the use of its 
weapons. China has a no-first-use (NFU) policy, but remains opaque on its exact 
interpretation. The DOD states in 2014, “There is some ambiguity over the conditions 
under which China’s NFU policy would apply, including whether strikes on what China 
considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high-altitude bursts would constitute 
a first use.”52 Thomas J. Christensen, director of the China and the World Program at 
Princeton University, is also concerned. He discusses that future war-fighting using key 
weapon systems like the modernized submarine, armed with nuclear weapons, may blur 
the lines between conventional and nuclear war.53 In addition, it is not clear who has the 
authority to fire nuclear weapons in the PLAN. He goes on further to say that the United 
States and its allies should increase their capabilities to hunt submarines to increase the 
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difficulty for the PLAN to communicate with its submarine commanders while at sea.54 
The United States faces many implications concerning the Chinese submarine force 
whether it is involving conventional attacks or deterrence with nuclear weapons. Each of 
these topics requires further investigation. 
A more tempered view of the threat posed by the PLAN appears in the book Red 
Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and Challenge to the U.S. Maritime Strategy, 
published by Naval War College. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes observe that 
while the PLAN may possess a plethora of submarines and missiles, the people who 
operate the equipment are not as skilled as those of other nations. The authors state, “The 
Chinese navy still has a long way to go in “software” areas such as training, education, 
seamanship and the myriad of other skills that comprise battle readiness.”55 
D. RELEVANT SECURITY CONCEPTS 
Countering submarines may be difficult for states to address in their security 
concept. Submarines can be seen as threatening based on certain capabilities, but also 
may be viewed as a defensive tool for other states. For states to understand better if 
submarines pose a threat, they must understand the capabilities that states possess. This 
section first discusses what role submarines play in a security dilemma, and then it 
analyzes the potential, and finally discusses how states can respond to a potential 
submarine threat. 
1. Security Dilemma  
The security dilemma has an important role to play in the East Asia region, and 
especially in the context of modernized submarines. The modernization of the PLAN 
submarine fleet may increase conflict in the region due to uncertainty in states’ behavior. 
The term “security dilemma” was coined in 1959 in John Herz’s International Politics in 
the Atomic Age. The term was first used to describe how states arm themselves to provide 
their own security because they are unsure of another state’s intentions. However, this 
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scenario creates a cycle; other states will be compelled to arm themselves since they are 
unsure of the other’s intentions. This cycle continues because no higher power or 
authority is controlling the situation or protecting them.56 This situation could be in the 
process of being played out in East Asia as China modernizes its undersea fleet.  
Robert Jervis further expanded this theory when he argued that the most 
dangerous and unstable scenario occurs when offensive weapons are not easily 
distinguishable from defensive weapons and when the offense has the advantage.57 The 
offense having the advantage means that it is “easier to destroy the other’s army and take 
its territory than it is to defend one’s own.”58 Submarines can easily be seen as both 
offensive and defensive platforms based on their operating location, silencing 
capabilities, and weapons payload. Furthermore, the fact that submarines operate under 
water and out of plain view creates further problems if an opposing state does not possess 
any type of ASW. Using Jervis’ definition, submarines can create an unstable scenario 
because of the capabilities that they possess, which creates an unknown fear in an 
adversary. 
2. Dangers of Submarines  
Submarines have created havoc for nations in the past. The Falklands Campaign 
between Argentina and Britain provide an example. Argentina owned few submarines, all 
of which were diesel-electric. However, it was able to use one submarine very effectively 
during the campaign.59 The Royal navy along with NATO’s North Atlantic ASW force, 
Antisubmarine Group 2, one of the best in the world at that time, experienced much 
difficulty tracking one of Argentina’s submarines, the San Luis. This lone submarine was 
able to attack the British Task Force twice, without being detected. The captain of the 
San Luis stated, “I don’t think that they knew we were there until they heard our 
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torpedoes running.” As a result, almost all weapons fired in the British ASW campaign 
were aimed at false targets.60 China owns 53 diesel-attack submarines, and it could easily 
flood the China Seas and the Indian Ocean with a great deal of undersea power. 
Submarines were also used during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the situation 
could have escalated quickly. The Soviet Union sent four diesel-electric submarines from 
its 69th torpedo submarine brigade, each armed with 22 torpedoes and a nuclear warhead, 
for a total of 88 torpedoes and four nuclear warheads.61 Nuclear weapons on submarines 
create a new dimension to any crisis or war. To locate the threat of nuclear weapons, a 
nation will use all available resources to track and subdue the threat. During this period, 
confusion and misperceptions can cause further conflict. The Soviet captains 
commanding the submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis had limited access to 
information above water. The Soviet submarine captains were also operating on unclear 
orders, which each boat captain interpreted differently from their superiors, regarding 
their nuclear weapons. Captain Nikolai Shumkov remembers hearing before he left for 
the crisis, “if they slap you on the left cheek, do not let them slap you on the right one.”62 
Another captain recalls other instructions, “I suggest to you, commanders, that you use 
the nuclear weapons first, and then you will figure out what to do after that.”63 A non-
threatening action taken by the United States could be perceived as threatening, and could 
have caused the Soviets to launch nuclear weapons, then creating a chain reaction. 
Interviews with the Soviets after the crisis revealed, “All the Soviet captains recalled their 
state of extreme tension and confusion in a situation where the war above could have 
begun any time.”64 The Soviet submarine captains were operating on vague orders, had 
little radio connection, and did not want to return home defeated. This situation caused 
Captain Valentin Savitski, while believing his submarine was under attack, to give the 
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command of arming their nuclear torpedo for fear of defeat. However, his crew was able 
to deescalate the situation and they eventually surfaced their vessel.65  
A third incident involving submarines occurred in March 2010 off the shores of 
the Korean peninsula. North Korean launched a secretive submarine attack against South 
Korea and sank the corvette ship Cheonan, killing 46 of its sailors.66 The Cheonan never 
suspected a submarine attack that night. Due to the covertness of a submarine, it can 
launch a torpedo or other weapon on its target, without any indications given. Submarines 
can change the dimensions of a battle or war because of their unique capabilities. 
Submarines are sometimes anticipated in battles, but are difficult to engage due to 
their covert nature. Even when they are anticipated, leaders may have issues during 
conflicts because of a lack of communication. Other times, submarines are not 
anticipated, and then strike when an opponent is least ready. Submarines have a large role 
to play concerning a security dilemma because of the lack of transparency that submarine 
fleets possess. Submarines may hinder the ability to create a region of stability because 
states are unsure of the capabilities of another state’s submarine fleet. 
3. Ways to Respond to the Submarine Threat 
Submarines create a complex situation for rival navies and states have a range of 
options to choose from to determine how they respond to a rising power and the 
modernization of submarines. On one level—in an attempt to contain the rising power’s 
strength—states can respond either symmetrically or asymmetrically that would be 
considered “hard hedging.”67 These types of response can include enhanced military 
capabilities to match the opponent, forging military alliances to provide matching 
military capabilities, or exclusive military exercises with nations that provide 
symmetrical capabilities.  
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However, states do not have to engage in “hard hedging” to respond to submarine 
modernization; they can also have a type of relaxed response known as “soft hedging.”68 
This type of response would be non-military related and can be categorized as a way to 
increase communication and diplomacy with the goal of increasing stability in the region. 
“Soft hedging” could be cooperative policies with China, forums that discuss the role 
submarines, and potential ways to conduct joint operations. In addition, any form of 
ASW forums, military ASW exercises, or discussions that include China, all with the 
goal of improving dialogue to understand better intentions to curb future conflicts, could 
be labeled as a “soft hedging.” 
For a state to have a balanced or stable response, it cannot only focus on one 
category; it must perform both “hard” and “soft” hedging. If a state only takes a soft 
response, it could jeopardize its own security because China or other states could 
perceive a state to be weak. A weak state may have its sovereignty infringed upon that 
may result in a destabilized region. However, if a state only pursues hard responses, other 
states may feel threatened from a hostile stance because opportunities for diplomacy may 
not exist. States, as well as regions, would benefit from balanced responses in the hopes 
of creating areas of certainty and stability. This thesis includes an analysis of states’ 
response to the Chinese submarine modernization to evaluate if these states are further 
destabilizing the region with their responses to the PLAN. 
E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS, HYPOTHESIS, AND ROADMAP 
This thesis presents three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that other nations 
will perceive actions to modernize a submarine fleet as threatening and destabilizing to 
the region because of failure of the CCP, the ruling party of the People’s Republic of 
China, to offer transparency regarding its military’s intentions. That is, the hypothesis 
suggests that were China more transparent about its intentions, a similar sized buildup 
would not be viewed as threatening. India, Japan, and the United States may see China’s 
ambiguity regarding military doctrine as a reason to strengthen their own ASW 
capabilities and participate in joint ASW exercises, which may lead to greater strength in 
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military alliances. Currently, the only formal military alliance among this triad is between 
Japan and the United States. Japan and India have entered into security cooperation, but 
not a formal alliance. The threat from China may push these nations to enter into a formal 
alliance to signal a “hard” counter balance strategy of China. To create greater stability, 
these nations will also attempt to balance their own “hard” actions with a “soft” 
approach. 
The second hypothesis is that, as China modernizes its fleet, Japan may attempt to 
alter its military force by allowing its Self-Defense Force to evolve into a “normal” 
military. This thesis examines if Japan’s normalization is a direct result of China’s 
submarine growth or because of an increase in China’s general military growth. This 
action alone could greatly alter the dynamics in the region, which is why Japan may also 
want to participate with China in “soft” engagements. 
The third hypothesis is that the PLAN submarine developments have created a 
naval arms race, which could bring less stability to the region. While the PLAN acquires 
SSBNs, India may acquire more SSNs or SSKs to counter the PLAN, in an attempt not to 
match the PLAN, but hold at risk its forces. Since Japan is not a nuclear-armed nation, it 
could increase its SSKs or SSNs, in an attempt to counter the PLAN threat. Japan then 
may increase its participation in ASW joint military exercises to maintain its proficiency 
at the highest level.  
This thesis uses the comparative case study method by examining three nations, 
India, Japan, and the United States, and their reactions to the modernization of the PLAN 
submarine fleet. Each chapter examines the nation’s annual defense reports, academic 
journals, scholarly reports, and publications to analyze how each nation views China and 
its submarine fleet, and how its modernization has may create potential conflict between 
the nations. In addition to these reports and publications, this thesis assesses 
antisubmarine tactics and strategy, and offers different approaches on the ability to 
counter the perceived threat.  
Chapter II characterizes the Chinese submarine buildup. Chapter III examines the 
Indian perspective and addresses the issues that India perceives from the PLAN. Chapter 
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IV offers the Japanese view and analyzes the threat perceptions that it has of the PLAN. 
Chapter V reviews the PLAN from the U.S. perspective and concludes by offering 
recommendations on how these nations could counter the Chinese submarine threat 
through maritime strategies, collective alliance agreements, or policies. 
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II. CHINESE SUBMARINE MODERNIZATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the end of Cold War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has undertaken 
efforts to build up its PLAN and undersea forces to challenge the U.S.’ naval supremacy 
in East Asia, as well as other nations in smaller seas.69 Chinese Naval Officers, Captain 
Shen Zhongchang, and Lieutenant Commanders Zhang Haiying and Zhou Xinsheng, 
argue submarines will become a major naval warfare force, which will increase the need 
to dominate undersea spaces, as well as increase ASW measures. When the release of 
Beijing’s defense white papers began in 2000 to identify the United States as the most 
important potential foe, it was clear that the PLAN would have to improve its undersea 
fleet to have the capacity to challenge the United States.70 In 2000, the PLAN submarine 
fleet consisted of approximately 64 submarines with eight in reserve.71 Since 2000, the 
PLAN has created its own derivatives of submarines to include the Ming SSK, the ultra-
quiet Yuan SSK, and also added the nuclear-powered Shang SSN, and the most-
threatening Jin SSBN.72 It is important to analyze submarine growth because the 
submarine platform has the ability to create greater instability in a region than other 
platforms because they create a complex security environment.73 These new submarines 
demonstrate the capacity of the PLAN to strengthen its undersea force, which further 
complicates the security in the region. 
As the PLAN grows in strength and numbers, China allows its military to 
participate in some international missions, but ultimately, the CCP keeps its military’s 
true intentions to itself. Jane’s Fighting Ships wrote in 2001, “China is a country that 
                                                 
69 Howarth, China’s Rising Sea Power: The PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge, 9. 
70 Paul H. B. Godwin, “China’s Emerging Military Doctrine: A Role for Nuclear Submarines?,” in 
China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 49. 
71 Richard Sharpe, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2000–2001, 103rd ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 
Group, 2000), 115. 
72 O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and 
Issues for Congress, 12. 
73 Sam Bateman, “Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Proliferation in the Seas of East 
Asia,” Asian Security 7, no. 1 (February 28, 2011): 61–84, doi:10.1080/14799855.2011.548213. 
 22 
makes a virtue out of its military isolation.”74 The problem is that China’s isolated 
military is one cause for instability in the region. If the CCP would allow for more clarity 
and openness with its intentions and capabilities of its military, it could foster greater 
stability in this area of the world. Many theories have surfaced as to why China improved 
its naval forces. However, for what purpose is China planning to wield this power and 
will this rise bring about conflict in the region? However, if China continues to limit 
discussions of its military intentions with the outside world, it will be hard to get a firm 
answer.  
To understand the PLAN, and for what purpose the CCP uses its naval force, 
several approaches are possible. One way to analyze its naval power is through its white 
paper released in 2011, which stated, “The fundamental purpose of modernizing the 
Chinese armed forces is to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity 
and interests of national development.”75 By applying its naval force to achieve its goals, 
it is possible to understand the reason for China’s modernization with the hope to prevent 
future conflict or war. The White Paper also explains what its goals or core interests of 
China are by stating, “China is firm in upholding its core interests which include the 
following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national 
reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social 
stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social 
development.”76 China also claims that its actions are defensive in nature.77 The issue 
stems from the core interests of China being nationally centered, but its interests are 
being infringed upon from international factors, which cause its military to modernize to 
safeguard its national goals. Two international issues that a naval lens can be applied to 
are China’s sovereignty through national reunification and economic development. 
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The CCP believes that there can only be one China. In white papers regarding 
Taiwan, China argues that islands once occupied by Japan and Taiwan, under the 1943 
Cairo Declaration, are Chinese territory and Beijing is the legal government of these 
areas.78 The sovereignty of China and national reunification of Taiwan could be 
considered more stable if the actions of the PLAN regarding cross-straits relations were 
not seen as hostile. From an outside perspective, the modernization of the PLAN looks as 
if China is preparing to prevent any access by other nations to the China Seas region. A 
2014 report to U.S. Congress, states, “China’s growing anti-access/area denial 
capabilities increasingly will challenge the ability of the United States to deter regional 
conflicts, defend longtime regional allies and partners, and maintain open and secure 
access to the air and maritime commons in the Asia Pacific.”79 Even though the United 
States and China have held a joint Strategic and Economic Dialogue since 2009, Taiwan 
is not addressed accordingly during this event.80 This event is a step in the right direction; 
but the hard issues are not discussed at length, which needs to occur for greater stability.  
In addition to China’s sovereignty, its economy plays another vital role in 
understanding the PLAN modernization. The CCP understands that its nation is growing 
larger every year and that it must provide for its people. The CCP must increase its 
wealth and power to accommodate this population increase. Resources are one aspect that 
allows a nation to grow, so the CCP must ensure that it has a steady inflow of raw 
materials, oil, and other necessities. To accomplish this inflow, the CCP had to alter its 
maritime strategy, according to Nan Li in his article, “The Evolution of China’s Naval 
Strategy and Capabilities: From “Near Coast” and “Near Seas” to “Far Seas.” He 
discusses how the PLAN’s naval strategy has shifted over the years, beginning with a 
“near-coast defense” in the 1980s to the “far-seas operations” of today. Li argues that the 
major driving force behind this shift was the PLAN commander, Liu Huaqing, who, 
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served from 1982 until 1988. In Liu’s memoirs, he references Alfred Mahan’s The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, who argued that navies are essential to the growth 
of a nation by establishing control of sea lines of communication.81 To best control sea 
lines, a nation must grow its naval force, and with it, its submarines.  
This chapter analyzes the modernization of the PLAN submarine fleet since 2000 
because, at that time, the PLAN signaled that changes were occurring in the submarine 
community. Beginning in 2002, the PLAN launched its Type 093 nuclear attack 
submarine, an upgrade to its older Han-class.82 Then in 2003, Navy Admiral Zhang 
Dingfa took over as leader of the PLAN, which was the first time a submariner held this 
position.83 In 2004, Admiral Zhang was then awarded a seat on the Central Military 
Commission, “China’s most important national security decision-making body.”84 Also 
in 2004, the PLAN launched its Type 094, an upgrade to its older Xia-class submarines.85 
With a submariner leading the PLAN, and new types of submarines emerging, the 
PLAN’s modernization was underway. By comparing the changes in the submarine fleet 
from 2000 to today, this chapter provides a baseline of its recent modernization for 
comparison with the navies of India, Japan, and the United States in later chapters.  
B. TYPES OF SUBMARINES 
The PLAN submarine fleet is composed of three different types of submarines: 
conventional (diesel-electric patrol submarines [SSKs] and diesel-electric guided missile 
submarines [SSGs]), nuclear-attack (SSNs) and nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBNs), and air-independent propulsion submarines.86 This section analyzes 
each type. See Table 1 for a complete list of PLAN submarines.  
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Table 1.   PLAN Submarine Growth 
Source: Richard Sharpe, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2000–2001, 103rd ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 
Group, 2000), 115–120; Stephen Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013–2014, 116th ed. (Alexandria, 
VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2013), 127–34; IHS Jane’s, “IHS Jane’s World Navies: China,” April 15, 
2015.  
*Sources do not indicate how many are currently capable of carry the JL-2 missiles. 
1. Conventional Submarines 
The PLAN has several types of conventional submarines: SS Type 035, Ming-
class, SSG Kilo-class, SSG Type 039/039G, Song-class, and SSG Type 039A, Yuan-
class. These submarines are all diesel-electric powered and have the ability to carry an 
assortment of weapons to include surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), ASCMs, and wake-
homing torpedoes. These submarines can rest on the bottom of the ocean floor and turn 
off their engines in an attempt to avoid ASW detection. In addition, the China coast is a 
 2000 2015 
SSBN Type 092 Xia-class 1 1 
SSBN Type 094 Jin-class 0 4* 
SSB Golf-class 1 1 
SSN Type 091 Han-class 5 3 
SSN Type 093 Shang-class 0 6 
SSK Type 039A/041 Yuan-
class 
0 12 
SSG/SSK Type 039/039G 
Song-class 
4 13 
SSK Type 033 Romeo-class 40 0 
SSK Type 035 Ming-class 19 19 
SSK Project 877EKM/636 
Kilo-class 
6 12 
SSA Type 032 Qing-class 0 1 
TOTALS 77 72 
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noisy environment flooded with diesel-electric freighters and trawlers, allowing the 
Song-class to disguise its acoustic signature.87 Their mission is to disrupt SLOCs and 
attack battle fleets.88 
a. SS Type 035, Ming-class 
This class was originally commissioned in 1971. In 2000, the PLAN had 
approximately 19, but today it only has 16. The Ming-class, a patrol submarine, primarily 
attacks with Yu-4 torpedoes, but these submarines can also lay mines. The range for a 
passive homing Yu-4 torpedo is 8.1 nm (nautical miles).89 These submarines are older 
and lack the newer technologies, but China may use this submarine as a decoy or to bait 
an enemy submarine.90 
b. SSG Type 039/039G, Song-class 
This class was originally commissioned in 1999. In 2000, the PLAN had four of 
them. In 2015, it has 13 in the fleet.91 The Song-class is replacing the Ming-class and this 
diesel-electric submarine has advantages over nuclear-powered submarines in shallow 
waters, specifically in the Taiwan Straits.92 The Song-class is armed with SSMs, and 
active and passive torpedoes. The SSM, C-801 that this submarine can carry has a range 
of 22 nm.93  
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c. SSG Kilo-class (Project 877EKM/636) 
This class was originally commissioned in 1994. In 2000, the PLAN had four 
boats operational. Since then, their number has increased to 12, all built at Russian 
shipyards.94 The first two were known as Project 877 and all later variants are known as 
636. The 636, as compared to the 877, has a longer submerged time and greater 
endurance because of an advanced engine design. The investment the PLAN has made in 
this model has given the PLAN an advantage in the South and East China Sea. Some 
sources claim that this model is one on the world’s quietest diesel-electric submarines.95 
These submarines can be loaded with missiles, torpedoes, and mines.96 Also, eight of 
these submarines have been fitted to carry an advanced ASCM, the SS-N-27.  
d. SSG Type 039A/041 Yuan-Class  
The Yuan class was originally commissioned in 2006. By 2015, China had 12 of 
these in operational status.97 This new type of patrol submarine has benefitted from new 
quieting technologies. Some sources state this class is 039A, and others claim it is the 
041. This thesis does not make the distinction between the two; however, two of the 
Yuan-class vessels also have been fitted with the Stirling-type air-independent propulsion 
(AIP) system.98 For combat capabilities, this submarine has the ability to carry the C-801 
SSM, and active and passive torpedoes. 
2. Nuclear Submarines 
The PLAN’s nuclear submarines can be divided into two categories, SSN nuclear-
attack and SSBN nuclear ballistic-missile submarines. Conventional submarines tend to 
be quieter and slower than nuclear-powered, which tend to be louder and faster. 
However, the capabilities that nuclear power affords a submarine are great. By harnessing 
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the energy in nuclear reactors, these submarines can maintain faster speeds over longer 
periods, in an attempt to outrun torpedoes, quickly attack an enemy, or outrun ASW 
tactics.99 In addition, a primary advantage of nuclear submarines is the long range that 
the platform provides. These submarines have the capability to remain at sea, or even 
remain submerged for months at a time.100 The PLAN has invested time and energy 
building up its nuclear submarine fleet, which could greatly increase their undersea 
presence. 
a. SSBN Type 094, Jin-class 
This type was first launched in 2004, commissioned in 2007, and the PLAN now 
has four hulls.101 This class represents the PLAN’s capacity to modernize. According to 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Jin-class is the PLAN’s quietest nuclear submarine 
to date.102 The goal for this platform is to launch a JL-2 missile, and reports have 
indicated that China performed a successful launch in 2013.103 The JL-2 is equipped with 
a single warhead with the ability to target India or Alaska from Chinese waters.104 This 
class can hold 12 JL-2 missiles, which would give the PLAN a formidable platform akin 
to the U.S. Ethan Allen class subs commissioned in the 1950s.105 The PLAN may be 
creating an advanced SSBN Type 095, which could be quieter than the Jin-class, but no 
reports have confirmed its production.  
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b. SSN Type 091, Han-class 
The Han-class is a nuclear-powered submarine intended to hunt other submarines 
and other surface ships using torpedoes and non-nuclear missiles. This class was 
originally commissioned in 1984, and in 2000, numbered five; however, that number has 
been reduced to three. In 2003, the PLAN decommissioned hull no. 401, and in 2007, 
hull no. 402.106 Due to improved designs and newer technologies, it appears this class 
will be replaced on a one-for-one basis with the improved Shang-class submarines.107 
c. SSN Type 093, Shang-class 
This class is similar to the Russian Victor III design, first commissioned in the 
late 1960s, as China received help from Russian experts to complete this class. This type 
is a new class for the PLAN, which they started to commission in 2006. They now have 
six.108 This class can be loaded with SSMs, active and passive torpedoes, and is designed 
for patrol the maritime periphery. In addition, it will most likely be used as an escort for 
the SSBNs and aircraft carrier task force.109 
3. Air Independent Propulsion Submarines 
AIP technology can enhance non-nuclear submarines by allowing these quiet 
hulls to stay submerged longer—sometimes up to two full weeks—and can allow the 
submerged vessel to reach higher speeds if needed. Normally, if a diesel submarine 
performed an attack run, the submarine would have to use most of its energy during this 
phase, and after a weapons release, the submarine would be forced to surface to recharge 
its batteries. After surfacing, the submarine’s position would be compromised. If a 
submarine were equipped with AIP technology, the submarine would not have to surface 
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after an attack run because it could still operate its motors, allowing it to stay 
submerged.110 
It has been reported that China has fitted two of its Yuan-class submarines with 
AIP technology based on a German design. In addition to the two Yuan-class, Russia and 
China signed an agreement for Russia to sell four Project 677E Lada-class submarines.111 
It has been speculated that Russia may no longer produce the Lada-class, and it may shift 
its resources to a more advanced Kalina-class submarine that will be fitted with AIP. 
Thus, if China does not receive the Lada-class, it may acquire more advanced, AIP 
equipped Kalina-class submarines.112 
4. PLAN Submarine Growth 
The PLAN submarine fleet has shrunk in numbers of hulls while increasing in 
their quality and performance, as reflected in Table 1. The biggest improvements are the 
acquisition of the Type 094 Jin-class and the decommissioning of older class submarines, 
which has paved the way to allow for better quality submarines. 
C. OPERATIONS 
The PLAN has upgraded a majority of its shrinking submarine force, but the 
amount of deployments and standards of training need to be analyzed to evaluate 
properly the threat it poses. For the crew of a submarine to become proficient, multiple 
deployments, intense training, and operations at sea will have to occur. Since 2000, the 
PLAN’s submarines have ventured out farther than ever and more often, but the crews 
still lack experience. Federation of American Scientists reports that the PLAN just started 
to operate its SSNs on extended patrols and the SSBNs have yet to conduct a patrol.113 
Inexperience can be costly, in 2003, and in 2005, its submarine community faced 
setbacks. In 2003, one of its Ming-class submarines experienced a mechanical 
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malfunction underwater and all 70 members of its crew died. Then, in 2005, during a 
training mission, another Ming-class experienced a fire while the vessel was submerged 
causing it to stall out. No crewmembers were injured, but this type of malfunction does 
cause speculation as to how proficient the PLAN submarine community is at operating its 
equipment.114 It has also been reported that the submarine crews for the Kilo-class did 
not receive the amount of training that Russia recommended after China purchased some 
of its submarines. Russia suggested 18 months of training, while China reduced that time 
frame to 12 months, and then lowered it again to nine months.  
However, like its equipment modernization, its personnel’s training has also 
modernized to meet the demands of modern warfare. The PLAN has altered its training 
cycles to incorporate more realistic scenarios, such as “opposing force training.” and “far 
seas” training.115 The improvements implemented have increased their proficiency and 
capabilities, but they are still not as proficient as the U.S. military. Figure 1 illustrates 
that the number of deployments have increased in recent years but for its force to match 
the competency of the U.S. or Japanese forces, the number and duration of deployments 
will have to increase. The number of patrols that the PLAN submarine conducts 
compared to the quantity of submarines owned is very low. Figure 1 does not 
differentiate between submarines and ships, but if submarines conducted half of the 
patrols in 2013, the data would suggest that 13 patrols were conducted from a fleet of 72 
submarines. By comparison, the U.S. Navy conducted 31 nuclear deterrence patrols in 
2008 with 14 SSBNs.116 The U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission 
compiles this data and they report to Congress every year regarding national security 
implications between the two nations. Currently, the PLAN submarines are being used 
for antipiracy missions, maritime patrols, and maritime exercises.117 
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Figure 1.  PLAN Surface and Submarine Combat Readiness Deployments, 
2007–2013 
 
Source: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to 
Congress (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014), 285. 
In late 2013 and early 2014, the PLAN most likely used its submarines for the 
first time in anti-piracy missions. The PLAN deployed a SSN Shang-class from 
December 2013 until February 2104. Then again, in September and October, a SSK 
Song-class was deployed; both were in the Indian Ocean. Most notable was the first 
foreign port call of a PLAN submarine in its history when a Song-class visited Colombo, 
Sri Lanka.118 The participation of submarines in antipiracy missions helps the submarine 
crew with basic operations, as well as with working experience in the same water space 
as other vessels, increasing the skills of the crew. 
D. SUBMARINE WEAPONS PAYLOAD  
The PLAN has made substantial increases in the quality of weapons that its 
submarines can carry. These new weapons have caused concern for many different 
nations. The capacity for the weapons to inflict greater harm continues to increase and 
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many nations are watching carefully to assess the safety of their own maritime assets and 
home territories. 
1. SLBM JL-2 Missiles 
This missile is the PLAN’s upgrade to its JL-1. The JL-2 is based on its land-
based DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and IHS Jane’s believes that the 
first launches of this missile occurred in 2005.119 The Office of Naval Intelligence also 
reports that in 2012, this missile had successfully completed its testing and is ready to 
enter the force.120 Futures upgrades to the warhead may provide the ability to carry either 
a single nuclear warhead or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) 
that would carry a smaller yield.121 In addition to the warhead, the range will also 
increase, whereas the JL-1 had a maximum range of 2,200, the JL-2 could have a range 
up to 4,598 miles.122 However, successful targeting at this long range would prove to be 
difficult. 
2. SS-N-27 Sizzler 
This ACSM is currently carried on eight China’s Kilo submarines and has an anti-
surface capability out to 120 nm. They are Russian made and are some of the most 
capable weapons the PLAN operates.123  
3. Yu-5 Torpedo 
This torpedo is an ASW weapon that initially is guided by wire until the final 
phase where it uses active/passive homing to reach its intended target. This weapon has a 
maximum range of 16.2 nm.124  
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The PLAN has been improving its undersea fleet since 2000, as this chapter has 
shown, and the PRC does not give any indication of slowing this process down. Whether 
the reason is to aid in China’s sovereignty or to help sustain its economy, the submarine 
fleet looks threatening to other states. The challenge for China will be how and when to 
deploy its assets. It is also evident that the modernization of the PLAN is not complete. 
One of the most important steps, the PLAN’s first nuclear deterrent patrol, which would 
complete the nuclear triad, has yet to be accomplished.125 Through equipment 
modernization and effective training, this force is preparing for a larger role in the region. 
India, Japan, and the United States desire stability in the region. However, the PLAN has 
the capability to upset the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, Sea of Japan, and South 
China Sea.  
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III. INDIA’S VIEWS ON CHINESE SUBMARINE 
MODERNIZATION 
India argues in its 2007 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military 
Strategy that in the future decades, its nation will be among the “foremost centres of 
power” and, to help achieve this feat, its military will play a critical role.126 India 
envisions itself a leader among the world players, and its navy is currently taking steps to 
improve its presence not only in the region, but also across all the world’s oceans. 
However, Chinese submarines are threatening to destabilize the Indian Ocean region, as 
both states compete for regional interests. To become a center of power, the navy has 
outlined several key interests in its Maritime Doctrine along with its goals in its Maritime 
Military Strategy to achieve greater power. India is carefully monitoring the role of China 
and the potential for its submarines to disrupt India’s interests, which could hinder India’s 
vision of becoming a center of power. This chapter first discusses the Sino-Indian history 
and rivalry. It then describes how the PLAN’s modernization has caused the Indian Navy 
(IN) to procure more ASW assets. Then, it analyzes how the PLAN’s use of submarines 
could potentially threaten India’s ability to execute its maritime doctrine and could 
prevent India from achieving its national goals. This chapter then evaluates India’s 
response to the potential threat from the PLAN and its submarine force. 
A. SINO-INDIAN DISPUTES 
To understand better the present day tensions that exist in the Sino-Indian 
relationship, its history should be examined. Indian and China will have a difficult time 
agreeing to any type of policy involving cooperation because of their unresolved 
historical issues. This section first discusses the Sino-Indian border conflict and then 
analyzes China’s relationship with India’s enemy Pakistan. 
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1. Border Dispute 
India and China are connected through land borders, which are more than 2,000 
miles long. China also continues to occupy disputed territory in the Aksai Chin area near 
Jammu and Kashmir, while India occupies disputed territory in the Eastern sector, 
Arunachal Pradesh, near Burma. These two nations went to war regarding border 
disputes. They never resolved the dispute, and until an agreement is reached, tensions 
will exist in their relationship. 
One of the earliest wars at the border occurred in 1959 when India claimed that 
China invaded territory in the Ladakh region and began to occupy the area.127 This act 
was one of the first steps of Chinese aggression. Then again, in 1962, another war 
occurred when China invaded another area known as the North East Frontier Agency 
(NEFA) of India because of a border disagreement, as each side claims the territory.128 
Analysts argue that the unresolved border dispute is destabilizing to the region.129 India 
has not forgotten the occupation that China started in 1959, and because of the close 
proximity to China, India feels uneasy. Currently, a major concern of India is that 
Chinese land-based missiles can target every major Indian city; meanwhile, the PLAN is 
increasing this capability with new SLBMs. The PLAN has also had port visits in Sri 
Lanka, and has been cooperating with Pakistan. China will soon have the ability to 
surround India, and because, of a lack of transparency, along with an unresolved border 
dispute, India does not trust China. 
2. China’s Relationship with Pakistan 
Along with an unresolved border dispute that creates division in the Sino-Indian 
relationship, China’s relationship with Pakistan has perpetuated tensions between the two 
states. China has been increasing its military ties to Pakistan through missiles, 
technology, and submarines, while Pakistan remains an Indian enemy. Pakistan’s largest 
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arms supplier is China, which has been selling it a variety of military equipment.130 
During the 1990s, China provided Pakistan with weapons, including missile parts, as well 
as nuclear technology. Pakistan received M-11 missiles and launchers, which can be 
armed with nuclear warheads.131 It also received M-9 missiles and Dong Feng-21 
ballistic missiles to help counter the perceived threat from India. In addition, the Chinese 
built Pakistan’s first nuclear plant and have signed on to build additional nuclear 
plants.132 
While China has bolstered Pakistan’s missile and nuclear technology, it also may 
strengthen Pakistan’s undersea development. According to the Naval War College 
Review, Pakistan’s defense ministry has requested to purchase six diesel-electric 
submarines from China. The class of submarine is unknown, but Pakistan has requested 
the submarines to be AIP equipped.133 This relationship causes Asian security expert 
Iskander Rehman to write in Asian Security, “The PRC’s continued military and 
economic assistance to Pakistan, India’s main rival in South Asia, remains a major 
irritant in Sino-Indian relations and is perhaps the one single issue which aggravates India 
the most in its dealings with China.”134 It seems that China sees tremendous value in this 
relationship and will go to great lengths to protect it. Former Chinese President Hu Jintao 
describes this relationship, “We can give up gold but we cannot give up our friendship 
with Pakistan…Pakistan and China’s relationship is higher than the Himalayas, deeper 
than the Indian Ocean and sweeter than honey.”135  
India’s Annual Report 1966–67 published by its Ministry of External Affairs 
stated, “Developments in 1966 confirmed…not only the Chinese Government’s intense 
and all-around hostility against India but also their persistence…in playing Pakistan 
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against India and keeping the two countries of the subcontinent in a state of conflict.”136 
India’s perception is that while Pakistan has always been its enemy, a regional re-
balancing had occurred through China’s increased support for Pakistan, which causes 
India to feel alone in the region.  
B. INDIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINESE SUBMARINES 
China—possessing four times as many submarines as India—has not caused India 
to match the quantity, which has created an asymmetrical arms race. Some of China’s 
fleet is not relevant; the Ming class would struggle to sustain operational deployment in 
the Indian Ocean. Rather, India seems to be countering China’s most lethal threat, its Jin-
Class SSBN. India has increased its ASW capabilities since 2000 when it recognized that 
the PLAN was modernizing its submarine assets. Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi argue 
in the Naval War College Review that, “China’s rapid naval modernization and its forays 
into the Indian Ocean have forced New Delhi to rethink the role of its navy in 
maintaining the maritime balance of power.”137 As the PLAN grows and modernizes just 
like the rest of China, India’s military cannot sit idly, it must respond as Chinese assets 
slowly operate closer to India. Admiral D. K. Joshi, a former Indian Chief of the Naval 
Staff, argues that the advancement of the Chinese maritime forces “is actually a major, 
major concern for us, which we continuously evaluate and work out our options and 
strategies for.”138 Pant also states in 2013, that India is likely to spend around $112 
billion on acquisitions, from 2010 to 2016, which may be one of the largest procurement 
cycles in the world during this period.139 However, it can be seen that India is 
modernizing its fleet in response to the PLAN’s SSKs or SSNs, but the Indian 
government recently approved a budget that allows for the acquisition of nuclear attack 
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submarines.140 This acquisition can be perceived as an attempt to counter the PLAN’s 
SSBNS. India is not going to allow China to sail into the Indian Ocean uncontested. This 
section discusses India’s response through the acquisition of anti-submarine ships, 
aircraft, and submarines.  
1. Hard Hedging 
India’s 19th Chief of the Naval Staff argues in 2009 that China has a military 
force that must be addressed. He states: 
Our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap and 
countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean Region. The 
traditional or “attritionist” approach or matching “Division for Division” 
must give way to harnessing modern technology for developing high 
situational awareness and creating a reliable stand-off deterrent.141 
In February 2015, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security approved and funded a 
plan to improve its military to counter China’s growing military power. The new $8 
billion plan hopes to lessen the gap between the two militaries by calling for the funding 
of new anti-submarine ships and submarines.142 Prior to the new funding, India had 
already begun to transform its navy into a modern fleet, adding multiple ASW ships with 
the ability to hunt submarines. India, in 2012, commissioned its first SSN, the INS 
Chakra. The Indian Navy also possesses nine SSKs, which allows the IN to counter the 
Chinese threat. The SSK type submarine is used to hunt and attack other submarines, 
which is one of the best weapons against nuclear-powered submarines. Tsipis Kosta 
writes in Tactical and Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare that “by far the most effective 
weapon against a quiet deep-diving nuclear submarine is another submarine, since it can 
be equally if not more quiet, can occupy the same portion of the oceans as its quarry, and 
is large enough to accommodate extensive sonar arrays, their power sources and 
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elaborate processors and antisubmarine weapons.”143 The IN fully understands that to 
prevent or deter a Chinese SSBN in the Indian Ocean, it must possess the best weapon to 
counter the threat, which is why it focused on ASW capabilities compared to its one 
SSBN. 
a. Modernization of Anti-Submarine Ships 
The IN realized that one way to counter the PLAN’s submarine modernization is 
to have a formidable ASW capability, and ASW surface ships provide a means to 
accomplish this capability. This class of ship is important for the IN because the cost to 
purchase and operate is much less than a nuclear submarine. In addition, the IN personnel 
do not have experience conducting operations with a SSBN, while they already have the 
expertise to operate surface ships. In addition, the IN wanted to have its own unique 
ASW ships, so they started to build indigenous ships with Indian research and 
development. India’s first ASW specialist is the Corvette Class, INS Kamorta, which was 
first launched in 2010, and later commissioned in 2014.144 This ship was designed to 
hunt submarines, due to the presence of the PLAN in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). 
The main weapons on these vessels to hunt submarines are the RBU-6000 anti-submarine 
rocket launchers and the DTA-53 533 mm twin torpedo launchers along with an 
advanced hull-mounted sonar array to track submarines. The RBU-6000 shoots shaped 
depth charges that can be guided or unguided, but because the charge is shaped, it can 
puncture the hull of a submarine. The IN has ordered 12 additional units and plans to 
have four more operational by 2017.145 India believes that this type of ship will play an 
integral part in its fleet.  
The INS Kolkata is another ASW ship that is mostly indigenous. It was launched 
in 2006 and commissioned in 2014. This class, like the ASW corvettes, carries the RBU-
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6000 anti-submarine rocket, twin torpedo launchers, and an advanced hull-mounted sonar 
array. However, this class also has an active towed sonar array and is capable of 
embarking two helicopters to aid in the hunt for submarines.146 The towed sonar array is 
active, which allows for a greater search area. The embarkation of helicopters also allows 
for a greater search area through cooperative efforts; a helicopter can relay submarine 
data back to the ship, which enhances the undersea warfare picture. 
b. Anti-submarine Aircraft 
ASW ships are part of the formula to hunt submarines, but aircraft are needed as 
well to aid in the search of submarines, and India pushed hard to acquire new ASW 
aircraft for its fleet. When India learned the United States had a new ASW aircraft from 
Boeing, India desired to have its own version of this aircraft. India has a need to monitor 
submarine activity in the Indian Ocean and improved aircraft is one way to accomplish 
that need. 
In 2013, India received the first of three in a shipment of eight of Boeing’s newest 
long-range maritime reconnaissance (LRMR) ASW aircraft, the P-8I.147 After the first 
eight are received, India plans to add 11 more by 2020.148 The additional aircraft will 
increase India’s maritime surveillance in the Indian Ocean and in the Bay of Bengal for 
the long term. This aircraft uses some of the newest ASW equipment to include sensors 
and weapons that will allow for improved searches for submarines. Aircraft have the 
ability to search large swaths of the ocean and can relay that information back to a ship. 
In addition, aircraft can move to a search sector faster than ships, greatly enhancing the 
search. 
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c. Submarines 
Ships and aircraft are essential to hunt submarines, but the IN wants a full ASW 
complement and to possess a strong undersea nuclear force. In 2012, the IN took a huge 
step forward when it began to operate its first nuclear-powered submarine, through a 
lease with Russia. This lease resulted in India being only the sixth nation to operate a 
nuclear-powered submarine, and placed its navy on a higher echelon as compared to 
other navies.149  
The IN, if it wants to deter China, must react. Swaran Singh states in the Journal 
of the Indian Ocean Region that the IN has been “pumping up its muscles” in response to 
China’s naval modernization, which has often been seen as its primary stimulus for the 
IN.150 In 2000, India had a total of 20 submarines, 18 of which were operational, in three 
different classes, and all were diesel-electric powered.151 In 2015, India has 15 
submarines, but it has added two different classes since 2000, SSBNs and an SSN, as 
shown in Table 2. These additions show that India wants to have an undersea capability 
that can rival powerful nations. 
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Table 2.   Indian Submarine Growth 
 2000 2015 2020–2025 
SSK Type 1500 Shishumar-
class 
6 4 4 
SSK Type 877EM/636 
Kilo/Sindhughosh-class 
10 9 9 
SS Type 641 Foxtrot-class 4 0 0 
SSBN Arihant-class 0 1 1 
SSN Project 971 Akula 
(Schuka-B) -class  
0 1 1 
SSN Project 0 0 6 
SSK Project 75, Scorpene 0 0 6 
SSK Project 75I, equipped 
with AIP and land attack 
capability 
0 0 6 
TOTALS 20 15 33 
Source: [This table combines information regarding commissioned submarines both in active and reserve 
status.] Richard Sharpe, Jane’s Fighting Ships: 2000–2001, 103rd ed. (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information 
Group, 2000), 291–93; Stephen Saunders, IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2013–2014, 116th ed. (Alexandria, 
VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2013), 322–25; “World Navies: India,” July 13, 2015, https://janes. 
ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId=+++132269
6&Pubabbrev=JWNA; Atul Chandra, “Indian Navy Procurement Plan,” Force: National Security and 
Aerospace Newsmagazine, accessed October 30, 2015, http://www.forceindia.net/newsyoucanuse_ 
indian_navy_procurement_plan.aspx; Rajat Pandit, “Gov’t Approves Construction of 7 Stealth Frigates, 6 




The INS Arihant, India’s first indigenous nuclear submarine, is a source of pride 
for India. This submarine puts India in the same category as the United States, Russia, 
China, the United Kingdom, and France as the only nations to build nuclear-powered 
submarines. India had Russia’s help with the design of this submarine, which was based 
on the Akula-class submarine.152 The Russian Akula-class submarines are understood to 
                                                 




be Russia’s fastest, quietest, and modern submarines.153 While the Akula-class does not 
carry SLBMs, the INS Arihant will likely carry up to 12 SLBMs for the IN.154 However, 
one SSBN does not constitute a complete strategic deterrent, so it will have to produce 
more in the future, which is a step toward increasing a maritime presence. 
The IN added another submarine that was originally Russian built, now named the 
INS Chakra. A nuclear powered attack boat, INS Chakra is part of the Akula (Schuka-
B)-class submarines that is part of a 10-year lease with Russia. This submarine was 
commissioned in 2012, and its use will help the IN crews to understand better how to 
operate nuclear-powered submarines and will also bolster its presence in the Indian 
Ocean.155 
d. Exercises 
Another form of hard hedging is evident through Exercise Malabar. This event 
occurs in the Indo-Pacific region, and in 2015, the participants were India, the United 
States, and Japan. Submarines from both India and United States participate in this event 
to create a strong maritime relationship in efforts to preserve the balance of power in the 
region.156  
2. Soft Hedging 
While India has responded to China with many intense actions, it has performed 
some relaxed responses that create a balanced approach. These actions have included 
several exercises and symposiums. The first is Exercise Hand-in-Hand, a joint exercise 
between China and India, which creates a platform for the two nations to discuss military 
issues. In 2014, the two nations participated in the fourth iteration of this exercise and 
mainly focused on army tactics to fight counter insurgency and counter terrorism. Both 
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nations agree that this exercise encourages a positive and friendly relationship between 
the two armies.157 
The second exercise that has helped to balance India’s approach is U.S.-led Rim 
of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). India participated for the first time in the RIMPAC 
exercise in 2014. Prior to this event, the navy participated as an observer in 2012. The 
growing influence of China in the region pushed the IN to participate in this exercise.158 
However, China also participated for the first time in this exercise, but neither navy sent a 
submarine to participate.159 RIMPAC exists to allow nations to cooperate on the high 
seas and serves as the world’s largest international maritime exercise.160 Even though 
neither state participated in submarine exercises, this event allowed the two navies to 
interact, with a potential to engage in positive discussion. The IN gains useful naval 
insight in the logistics of operating with many nations at sea during this event. 
India has also worked with China in several symposiums and the first is the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This event has been meeting since 
1967, but it was not until 1997 that China, Japan, and South Korea were invited, which 
created ASEAN +3—and has been held 15 times since 2000.161 ASEAN promotes 
economic growth and social progress, but more importantly, all members have adopted 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) that binds member states, and not observers, 
from using force or the threat of force against each other.162 This event shows China that 
India has a willingness to cooperate and wants the relationship to remain peaceful. In a 
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larger context, the stability of undersea domain remains hostage to diplomatic efforts.163 
If competition between states is hostile, the undersea environment will be, as well, which 
can create instability. 
The second event is the East Asian Summit (EAS), which is held directly after 
ASEAN and has occurred since 2005. It is typically held in the fall and the ninth EAS 
was held last November in Myanmar. This summit is important because it includes both 
India and China in discussions regarding maritime security/cooperation and 
disarmament/non-proliferation.164 This event again reiterates India’s desire to have a 
peaceful relationship with China. 
C. INDIA’S MARITIME INTERESTS 
India sees its navy as the primary stakeholder to protect its maritime interests. The 
IN uses two documents to guide its naval force, the first is the Indian Maritime Doctrine, 
which was released in 2009. This doctrine is used to guide the IN to achieve India’s 
national interests and acts as a point of reference. The second document, Freedom to Use 
the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy, is used as the plan to achieve the goals set 
forth in its doctrine.165 India intends to use its navy as a means to safeguard its interests. 
Two naval interests listed in the Indian Maritime Doctrine in direct conflict with Chinese 
military modernization are economic security and natural resources, including oil.166 For 
India to protect these interests, India’s Navy must have a maritime strategy that allows 
for a safe and secure environment. Indian Naval Commander Sibapada Rath argues that 
China has signaled the political will to deploy its forces far from its national shores, 
which demonstrates that it intends to transform its naval force from a coastal defender to 
a power projector.167 Chinese submarines will be a force that can directly infringe on 
India’s ability to protect its own interests.  
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1. Economic Security 
India’s Navy plays an important role in the protection of its economic security 
and is in conflict with China’s goal for economic security because China may pose a 
threat to India’s freedom of navigation. India is one of the most populous nations in the 
world with over 1.29 billion people.168 After India opened its economy, it achieved 
substantial growth, but the need for more resources to maintain economic growth also 
increased.  
a. Navy’s Security Role 
Supremacy over the IOR has become not only an interest for India, but also a 
need. Indian Navy Admiral Sureesh Mehta argues regarding the use of the navy, in 
Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy that “Our primary national 
interest therefore is to ensure a secure and stable environment, which will enable 
continued economic development.”169 The IN understands that the ocean is the primary 
way for its state to maintain growth, because without freedom of the seas, its population 
could suffer. Sureesh further argues that the navy also has another role to play by the way 
of prevention, “The Indian Navy is the primary maritime means by which the state 
ensures the use of the sea for its own purposes, while at the same time ensuring that 
others do not use it in a manner prejudicial to its interests.”170 The IN perceives that other 
states may infringe on the IOR, and it must be able to counter the challenges. 
Both India and China need to provide for their growing population through trade 
security. Both nations want to have freedom to navigate the world’s oceans and China’s 
recent maritime activity, such as when its Song-class submarines made a port call in Sri 
Lanka, infringes on the IOR.171 This body of water, India claims, is of “supreme national 
security interest of survival.”172 India and China may find themselves in a future conflict 
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because of their overlapping interests. Indian Naval Commander Gurpreet S. Khurana 
argues in the Indian Defence Review that China could find itself in a strategically 
vulnerable situation in the IOR in the case of a Sino-Indian conflict and China could 
remedy the situation by increasing its naval presence in the IOR.173 However, if China 
had an increased naval presence in the region, India could feel its security threatened, and 
would have to respond to counter the threat. Former Indian Chief of Southern Naval 
Command retired Vice Admiral K. N. Sushil argues the PLAN has a formidable 
submarine capability and the IN has “strategic capability yet to deter China.”174  
b. Strategic Location 
Trade across the oceans contributes to the economic growth of nations, an 
important element needed to maintain the growth of a nation, which was discussed in the 
previous section. The IOR has important trade value because of its size and location. The 
IOR contains almost 20 percent of the earth’s oceans and is the third largest oceanic zone 
in the world. In terms of trade, 80 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas transits this 
area.175 However, the Indian Ocean contains strategic choke points, and access in and out 
of the region could become disrupted, which would affect trade, if a situation occurred in 
one of the choke points.  
Choke points, because of their limited size, are crowded as more ships attempt to 
transit, which causes the vessels to be vulnerable. The United States Energy Information 
Administration identifies that four out of seven of the “world’s oil transit chokepoints” 
are found in the IOR.176 Tensions may arise between China and India regarding the 
protection of shipping through these vital sea lanes. India has recognized the strategy of 
crippling a nation’s economy through sea denial, which could be accomplished in the 
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choke points. India argues in its Maritime Military Strategy, “War on an enemy’s 
economy by denying the use of the seas during hostilities has been an age-old 
strategy.”177  
It is uncertain how far China will assert itself in the IOR to ensure that its sea 
lanes remain unblocked. At the same time, it is uncertain how far India will go to 
establish dominance in the IOR. A prominent Indian scholar, K. M. Pannikar, wrote in 
1945 that 
while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important 
oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that 
area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No 
industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political 
structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected.178  
The Indian Ocean to India also has symbolic value; it gives the nation a sense of 
pride for it is the only ocean in the world to be named after a nation. It seems that India 
would go to great lengths to ensure that its navy is never impeded in its operations in its 
“ocean.” India has a sense of responsibility to this ocean to ensure that all can transit safe. 
Iskander Rehman discusses this difficulty in Asian Security: 
The heightened Sino-Indian rivalry in the Indian Ocean provides a perfect 
example of how one country’s uncertainty in its trade expectations can 
become a major motivation behind regional military expansionism, which 
then can give birth to an arms race, increasing the chances of conflict.179  
Both China and India have to provide for their nations and oceanic trade is a way 
to do so. India finds some of its legitimacy in the Indian Ocean itself, and as these nations 
continue to grow, they could find themselves at odds over oceanic trade. 
2. Natural Resources 
The third naval interest of the IN in conflict with China regards natural resources, 
as both states vie for the rights to acquire the resources in the Indian Ocean. The Indian 
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Ocean is an area rich in resources and a major source of global energy supplies.180 The 
IOR has a tremendous amount of strategic raw materials; its littoral states contain more 
than 66 percent of the world’s oil reserves and 35 percent of the world’s known natural 
gas reserves.181 China and India have both increased their consumption of oil and natural 
gas and both need to maintain a constant supply. The competition to maintain their 
consumption could lead to conflict. Niclas D. Weimar states in Global Change, Peace & 
Security, “These resources are the crucial basis for the expansion and modernization of 
China’s military capabilities, perceived as essential security instruments amidst growing 
regional tensions.”182 China is competing directly with India for resources in the Indian 
Ocean. 
A Chinese oil company, PetroChina, outbid India and signed a deal in 2006 with 
Burma for the access rights to 6.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas off the coast of 
Burma.183 This landmark deal set off the project for two pipelines to be constructed by 
the Chinese. The pipelines will begin in a Burmese port where tankers will offload the oil 
and natural gas; the pipelines will then travel through Burma and end in China’s Province 
Yunan. The pipelines will have the ability to transport 440,000 barrels of oil a day and 12 
million cubic meters of natural gas a year to China. The oil originates from the Middle 
East and Africa, while the natural gas emanates from new developments off the coast of 
Burma.184 These pipelines will allow Chinese tankers to bypass the Straits of Malacca, 
saving time and money. As China has a greater presence in the region because of the 
natural resources, will China prevent India from accessing these resources or will India 
attempt to challenge China for them? 
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India has increased its own forces to counter a rising Chinese submarine force. 
India, like China, wants to exercise sovereignty over all claimed territories, and India 
knows that in the last decade, China has been able to flex its muscle in the maritime 
domain since the PLAN has the capacity to threaten India’s sovereignty. Retired Vice 
Admiral K. N. Sushil also worries that China’s submarines have the ability to threaten 
India’s assured second-strike capability, which “tips the deterrence balance.”185 Even 
though China and India have participated peacefully in military exercises and 
symposiums, naval conflicts of interest arise through natural resource disputes and fear of 
alliances with the other’s enemies. The CCP will continue to do what is necessary to 
allow its nation to grow to provide for its people, which is more important to the CCP 
than a cooperative relationship with India. 
India’s response, even though it demonstrates some more cooperative elements, 
seems to favor hard hedging over soft. Through increased spending, including a nuclear-
powered submarine, the IN has shown that it desires to possess a fleet with the ability to 
counter a modernizing PLAN fleet. Harsh V. Pant argues in “India Comes to Terms with 
a Rising China,” that the IN, similar to how the Chinese are preparing to deny access to 
the U.S. Navy, is preparing to deny the PLAN access to the Indian Ocean.186 India’s 
actions will likely create instability in the region as its naval policy continues to perform 
actions that demonstrate the IN has the ability to counter the PLAN’s naval force. Jervis’ 
security dilemma theory applies to the IOR, as India fails to distinguish the PLAN’s 
submarines as offensive or defensive weapons, especially if the IN fear losing its second 
strike capability. Even though a robust Indian Navy could bring stability to the region, the 
competition that could arise as these two states vie for resources and economic security 
will most likely create new tensions. The PLAN has chosen to operate more frequently in 
and around the Indian Ocean. Since Beijing has not always let its intentions be known, 
India has chosen to counter the Chinese. 
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IV. JAPANESE VIEWS ON CHINESE SUBMARINE 
MODERNIZATION 
Japan’s response to a rising China has particular significance because of their 
geostrategic rivalry. Japan must be able to protect its maritime interests through its 
JMSDF, and recent Chinese submarine modernization could threaten Japan’s ability to 
maintain its sovereignty. Postwar Japan has seemed to be a reactive state, only 
responding to outside pressures. However, Japan has recently taken on new initiatives 
that would allow its forces to meet and deter future challenges in the maritime domain, 
rather than employing a force that can only react to a threat. Japan chose to create a more 
dynamic force because of the strengthening of China’s military and perceived aggressive 
behavior by the PLAN. However, like India’s plans, the Defense Policy’s objectives are 
in direct conflict with Chinese modernization. This chapter first discusses Sino-Japanese 
history. Then, it reveals how Japan has responded to a rising China through strengthening 
its own military. Finally, it analyzes how the PLAN’s use of submarines could potentially 
threaten Japan’s economic development, and their goal of a stable maritime environment.  
A. SINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY 
To understand better a conflict in the maritime domain, a brief history of the Sino-
Japanese rivalry can help to explain the current day situation. China and Japan have a 
long history that is intertwined with catastrophic events that have generated ill feelings 
between them. Analysts argue that because Japan and China view their history through 
their own perspectives, a “history problem” exists, and it could impact regional affairs in 
a corrosive fashion.187 Both nations use their own history to pursue specific agendas that 
have prevented the countries from trusting one another, which causes instability in the 
region. This section first discusses how the governments of both nations create 
controversy through the ways that history is interpreted. Then, this section examines how 
the past creates political and territorial tensions.  
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1. Misaligned Memories 
Collective memory creates a lens for the nations to see through, and it is hard for 
the leaders to provide a different perspective for their people. Thomas Berger defines 
collective memory as, “ideas that a given society collectively holds about the past.”188 He 
then defines the history problem as how the collective memory differs between nations 
because each country constructs the historical narrative uniquely.189  
It is hard for an organization to put aside its core values to improve stability in the 
region. The CCP, for example, was created shortly before Japan occupied China. Since 
the CCP’s existence, it wanted to rid the nation of Japan. Susan L. Shirk writes in China: 
Fragile Superpower, “The Chinese Communist Party’s political legitimacy is bound up 
with its 1945 victory in the Anti-Japanese War.”190 Anti-Japanese sentiment is part of the 
CCP’s history, and its political leaders refuse to overlook this historical memory. Shirk 
later argues that politicians in China frequently use anti-Japanese rhetoric to mobilize 
popular support by diverting attention away from domestic problems.191 As the CCP 
continues to revisit history, it continues to drive a wedge between the two nations by not 
allowing its population a different lens to look through, which further destabilizes the 
region. 
While China’s current government was created with anti-Japanese sentiment, 
Japan had a new government formed after its loss in World War II. This leadership had to 
be created in part due to the failed effort to expand imperial Japan. Japan, in its efforts to 
start anew, actually employed old members of the imperial leadership while creating a 
“peaceful” Japan. Berger states, “Many members of Japan’s postwar conservative 
leadership were directly implicated in the expansion of imperial Japan, the war against 
the United States, and wartime atrocities.”192 Like China, Japan after World War II had a 
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government that contained members with a bias against the other nation, which fostered 
mutual distrust. As the nations move forward, their different collective memories will 
continue to foster mistrust against one other. This mistrust helps to fuel the strategic 
dilemma in the region.  
2. Disputed Islands 
China’s and Japan’s different memories of the past are carried over into 
disagreements over the sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea. In China, these 
islands are known as the Diaoyu Islands, and in Japan, the Senkaku Islands (see Figure 
2). Both nations claim the islands under different laws; Japan states that it should be the 
owner because when it formally incorporated the islands, they were uninhabited. These 
islands were a land without owner or “occupation of terra nullius,” and Japan held a 
cabinet meeting in 1895 to claim them.193 However, China sees it otherwise, and has its 
own claims. China states the islands were used during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), 
and that Taiwan had control over the land by the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912). Also, China 
argues that while it gave the islands to Japan under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 
under the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, Japan should return all territory seized 
through war.194 China is attempting to recover what it feels is rightfully its. Each side 
refuses to back down in this tense situation, as doing so would demonstrate weakness. 
Both sides seem to want to avoid a military confrontation, but the capacity for conflict 
exists. Analysts argue that, “due to the brutal Japanese occupation of China in the 1930s, 
sentiments over the status of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands run deeper in the Chinese 
psyche than any other territorial dispute in modern Chinese history.”195 Both states place 
a large emphasis on nationalism, and much of their identity is found in sovereignty. 
These islands will continue to be a contested area for the foreseeable future.  
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Figure 2.  Disputed Territory 
 
Source: Gavan McCormack, “Small Islands—Big Problem: Senkaku/Diaoyu and the 
Weight of History and Geography in China-Japan Relations,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: 
Japan Focus, accessed August 28, 2015, http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3464/ 
article.html.  
B. JAPAN’S RESPONSE TO CHINESE SUBMARINES 
As Japan and China’s contested history creates current territorial issues, a rising 
China, and specifically its military capabilities, is creating an Asian security dilemma. In 
a New Year’s speech at the beginning of 2015, Japan’s Defense Prime Minister Nakatani 
argued that China is sailing its naval vessels in the Pacific Ocean near Japan and actions, 
such as violating territorial waters, are creating a hazardous situation for both nations. He 
also states that the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) has a mission to secure peace and 
independence for Japan, and this force is determined to defend Japanese territory.196 In 
addition, former Commander in Chief, Self-Defense Fleet of the JMSDF, retired Admiral 
Yoji Koda argues, “China has a national objective to be a nuclear power comparable with 
the United States.” To accomplish this objective, he further states the PLAN must 
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“maintain a robust nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force and protect this 
force against antisubmarine warfare capabilities.”197  
Japan feels a need to defend itself because it views China as a threat, but Japan’s 
security ambitions seem to contradict Article 9 of its constitution. Article 9 states that 
Japan must not exercise “force as a means of settling international disputes.”198 In efforts 
to protect its national interests, coupled with the pressure felt from China, Japan may 
continue to come closer to remilitarizing. The PLAN’s submarine force has the capability 
to create further instability in the region. Koda also argues that the JMSDF should in the 
future “bear greater responsibility in supporting U.S. operations” in the South China 
Sea.199 In the meantime, Japan has favored a hard approach in response to a rising China, 
but some elements of “soft hedging” are evident, which shows Japan is also interested in 
a balanced approach to confront China. This section first discusses how Japan has 
increased its military capabilities by increasing its defense budget and by adding new 
equipment, such as new ships, submarines, and aircraft to its naval inventory. Then, it 
discusses the elements that have created a soft approach to China. Due to its historic 
rivalry and proximity to China, Japan has adopted a balanced approach. 
1. Hard Hedging 
The JMSDF has seen an increase in its core defense budget since Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe’s new administration took over in 2012. IHS Jane’s states, “The new 
Japanese government adopted a firmer stance toward Beijing characterized by an 
enhanced focus upon security issues and national defense policy.”200 This stance has 
increased core military spending, allowing the JMSDF to upgrade or acquire new 
equipment to aid in the security of Japan. Not all the increases in spending are directly 
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linked to the PLAN’s submarine modernization. However, the Japanese Minister of 
Defense, General Nakatani, argues that the increase in spending is due to the “changing 
situation,” caused by the Plan’s provocative actions201 One reason the PLAN’s 
modernization can be viewed as provocative is because some analysts believe that China 
can have the advantage in the undersea domain. Analyst Toshi Yoshihara argues, “The 
ASW competition will likely advantage China over time. The PLAN’s submarine fleet 
has been growing larger, quieter and more lethal in the past decade.”202 Previous 
governments in Japan sought to limit or cap military budgets, but Abe’s administration 
has a commitment to defense and the security of Japan because of regional issues. The 
2013 Fiscal Year (FY) defense budget grew by 0.8%, the first growth in 11 years, and the 
2014 FY budget increased by 2.8% to $46.4 billion. Previous budget plans set a five-year 
ceiling of $191 trillion, but with the 2014–2018 plan, the ceiling was increased $195 
trillion. With these increases, IHS Jane’s claims that Japan will abandon its defense 
funding ceiling and military core spending will exceed previous set limits.203  
Japan’s budget increases have allowed the JMDSF to procure much needed 
equipment to counter the Chinese submarine threat. Former Commanding General, 
Research and Development Command of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, retired 
Lieutenant General Yamaguchi Noboru, argues the Japan, in response to Chinese military 
modernization, must “increase the effectiveness of its deterrent force.”204 First, this 
section discusses ships, then aircraft, and finally, submarines. Some of the newest ships 
in the JMSDF inventory are the Hyuga-class and the Izumo-class ships. Both classes are 
categorized as helicopter-capable destroyers and can be compared to U.S. LHAs. These 
ships increase the JMSDF’s ability to detect the PLAN’s submarines. The JMSDF 
commissioned two Hyuga-class ships, DDH 181 and DDH 182, in 2009 and 2011, 
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respectively. These ships have the capability to launch or land approximately three SH-
60Ks simultaneously, allowing for more ASW assets than the Atago-class or Akizuki-
class destroyers. These ships also have six 324 mm torpedo tubes that can carry 12 
rounds of vertically launched anti-submarine rockets (ASROC), and possess an OQQ-21 
bow-mounted sonar.205 The main feature of this ship is the large number of ASW 
helicopters it can support. The ship features a large hangar bay that can hold up to 10 
aircraft, which allows this ship to deploy as a force multiplier in the ASW realm. 
This Izumo-class is the largest in the JMSDF inventory since World War II, 
measuring 813 feet long, just 200 feet shorter than a typical U.S. aircraft carrier. A 
JMSDF officer argues that this class ship “heightens our ability to deal with Chinese 
submarines that have been more difficult to detect.”206 The JMSDF commissioned its 
first ship in this class, JDS Izumo (DDH 183), in 2015, and it has plans to build more in 
this class.207 The Izumo-class is not fitted with torpedoes, but does have the OQQ-21 
hull-mounted sonar. Its biggest upgrade over the Hyuga-class is the ability to launch and 
land more ASW helicopters. While the Hyuga-class has four spots on its flight deck, the 
Izumo-class has five spots and its hangar bay can support up to 16 ASW aircraft, which 
enhances the ASW picture for the JMSDF. 
The JMSDF has two main ASW aircraft, Seahawk helicopters and the new P-1 
airplanes. JMSDF first used Seahawks, the SH-60J version in 1991, and possessed 103 of 
this type aircraft. It later updated this helicopter to the SH-60K variant.208 The JMSDF 
has added 55 of the SH-60K aircraft to its inventory since 2000. This new version has 
improved features like the Automatic Helicopter Combat Direction System (AHCDS), 
which allows multiple helicopters to share tactical information, a helpful feature while 
searching for a submarine. The Kawasaki P-1 aircraft is an indigenous design that 
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replaced its aging P-3 fleet. The P-1 entered into service in 2013, and includes some 
capable ASW features like the magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), that were not included 
in the new U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon.209 Commander Jun Masuda of the JMSDF states that 
the P-1 has the “mobility to fly out to distant destination waters swiftly and operate for a 
long time while remaining in operational areas is necessary” for detecting submarines.210 
Finally, the JMDSF is in the process of acquiring a new fleet of Souryu-class 
SSKs. The JMSDF already possesses 10 Souryu-class submarines, all equipped with AIP 
technology. Japan wants its 11th submarine in this class to possess lithium-ion battery 
technology, which would be the world’s first submarine to employ this technology. The 
government’s plan is to have 22 SSKs by 2020. To accomplish this task, Tokyo, in 
addition to building new submarines, will have to extend the life of its existing 
submarines.211 
Japan has modified, and continues to upgrade, its military capabilities in response 
to China’s military rise. Tomotaka Shoji, an analyst at Japan’s NIDS, argues that 
tensions, because of China’s assertiveness, in the South China Sea have created an 
unstable strategic environment, and that aggravated disputes could pose a serious 
threat.212 Japan is limited by its constitution but will continue to do everything that it can 
to protect its nation within these restrictions. Japan will have to rely on its alliances to fill 
in areas where it does not have the capabilities, but the JMSDF is a formidable naval 
force, able to track and hunt submarines. Retired Admiral Koda argues that China’s “true 
intent is difficult to ascertain…I think we should accurately determine China’s military 
                                                 
209 Tyler Rogoway, “Japan’s Totally Original Maritime Patrol Jet Is Hunting for Buyers,” Foxtrot 
Alpha, accessed February 15, 2016, http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/japans-totally-original-maritime-
patrol-jet-is-hunting-1716182328. 
210 Chieko Tsuneoka, “Japan’s New Surveillance Jet Expands Scope for Patrols,” The Wall Street 
Journal, June 26, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/06/26/japans-new-surveillance-jet-
expands-scope-for-patrols/?mod=WSJBlog&mod=japanblog. 
211 “Defence Budget Overview.” 
212 Shoji, “The South China Sea: A View from Japan.” 
 61 
power and calmly deal with it.”213 However, until Japan fully assesses the PLAN, its 
forces will continue to have apprehensions, and the region will be characterized by 
instability.  
2. Soft Hedging 
The rise of China is not only a military threat, as its economy has also been 
increasing in size and power, and Japan recognizes this threat. It has initiated several 
policies that have increased ties between the two nations as a means of engaging China, 
first economically, and second, in security discussions. From 1999 to 2004, Japan’s 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into China rose from $770 million to $4.567 billion.214 
These increases were a result of an optimistic view that Japan and former Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi held of China. Prime Minster Koizumi recognized that China’s 
economic growth presented an opportunity for Japan and sought bilateral cooperation.215 
Later in 2012, Japan’s FDI in China was as high as $7.38 billion, but regional incidents 
caused the FDI to drop. In September 2012, Japan “purchased” the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands from a private Japanese landholder, and then Prime Minster Abe visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine. These events caused investors to worry, and FDI then decreased by 
4.28 percent to $7.03 billion dollars.216 Regardless of the fluctuations, the economic ties 
could create unwanted risk if a military engagement were to occur.  
The second way that Japan has been initiating a relationship with China is in the 
ASEAN. Japan and China are both members of the ASEAN +3 Cooperation, which seeks 
“mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, and territorial integrity of all 
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nations.”217 Japan seeks to leverage ASEAN and its members, including China, to adopt a 
unified understanding on the laws regulating the maritime domain.218 Prime Minister 
Abe has been proactive in this association by meeting with member states individually 
and using ASEAN as a forum to bring stability to the maritime domain. Japan claims that 
China asserts excessive claims in the China Seas. In an attempt to counter China in a less 
aggressive form, Japan would like member states to reject China’s interpretation of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which limits the freedom 
of navigation of non-commercial ships.219 Japan is demonstrating to China that it is not 
going to tolerate China’s recent maritime activities that it deems hostile. Japan’s soft 
hedging against China is needed in a time when China has become aggressive in the 
maritime domain because other nations may not have the same ASW capabilities as 
Japan. China and Japan may find themselves in conflict since each nation is pursuing its 
own interests in this environment. 
In addition to ASEAN, Japanese and Chinese leaders have agreed to create a 
bilateral maritime mechanism to increase communication between the two states. The 
intent is for this bilateral mechanism to prevent future conflict.220 It is a positive step for 
these two states in the hope to prevent a security dilemma. 
C. NAVAL STRATEGY IN CONFLICT 
Japan has implemented both hard and soft policies in an attempt to counter China. 
However, another aspect of the security dilemma is the conflicting naval strategy 
between the two nations. Japan sees its defense forces as the primary means to protect its 
national security.221 To direct its forces, Japan has issued the National Defense Program 
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Guideline to provide its various departments a roadmap to achieve its national objectives, 
as well as a National Security Strategy. Several national interests of Japan are in conflict 
with China and the PLAN’s modernization. These conflicts will be problematic as both 
nations compete to achieve their own objectives.  
The first clash of national interests between Japan and China is the need for 
economic development through free trade in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan desires an 
“international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability.”222 Both 
states are competing in the same maritime region for the ability to maintain free trade. 
The second national interest of Japan that could lead to a confrontation with China is the 
“maintenance and protection of international order based on rules and universal values, 
such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of 
law.”223 The PLAN’s submarines have the capability to prevent Japan from achieving 
two of its national objectives required to safeguard its national interests. Analyst Alessio 
Patalano argues the PLAN has increased its capabilities to a new level. 
The PLAN submarine force had a crucial mission in providing a credible 
strategic deterrent…It set the intellectual foundations to link its existence 
to the security of the Chinese economy by presenting its roles in relation 
to the security of sea lanes, energy and maritime resources – all vital 
components of the country’s economic reforms.224 
Japan’s Ministry of Defense requires that its forces “improve the security 
environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct 
threats to Japan.”225  
1. Economic Development 
Japan desires for its nation to grow economically. For this growth to occur, it 
must maintain economic security, freedom of its trade routes on the ocean, and access to 
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natural resources. Japan needs stability at sea to maintain economic prosperity, as 
outlined in Japan’s National Security Strategy.226 China’s recent aggressive actions, 
coupled with its military modernization, have the capacity to prevent Japan from 
obtaining its national interests of economic development and stability in the maritime 
domain. Japan, as an island nation, relies heavily upon energy imports to provide for its 
people and create development. Up to 70 percent of its energy requirements are imported 
through the South China Sea.227 Japan’s businesses also import rare earth materials used 
for many different industrial purposes, and it is one of China’s largest customers of these 
materials.228 Japan needs these imports for economic growth, and for the sea routes to 
remain open. If not, it may have to alter its energy sources and business structures.  
China not only has power in the economic security realm. Its military 
modernization can cause disruptions to vital sea lanes needed for economic development 
as well, which worries Japan, especially since its military has shown an increased 
presence in the region. Japan closely monitors China’s activities in the South China Sea 
with the smaller maritime states, and Japan argues, “China is also expanding and 
intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than 
before.”229 The interests of Japan are in direct competition with China, which creates a 
destabilized situation in the region. Without diplomatic engagement and transparency 
from China, the tensions in East China Sea could escalate. 
2. Environment of Stability, Transparency and Predictability 
Japan continues to strive to create a stable environment in and around the China 
Seas and Pacific region though its policies and objectives. Another national interest that 
Japan would like to achieve to realize its goals of “open and stable seas” is “an 
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international environment that offers stability, transparency, and predictability.”230 
Recently, the maritime environment has experienced unpredictable events from the 
PLAN and Japan has viewed these actions as aggressive, especially in Japan’s territorial 
waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and the Senkaku Islands  
First, territorial waters extend from a coastline out to 12 nautical miles, and states 
have the right to establish sovereignty in this area according to UNCLOS Articles 2 and 
3.231 However, when islands or straits are considered, an interpretation of the law must be 
made. Legal passage of vessels through straits is viewed differently depending on the 
state and the wording that the state uses.  
In 2004, a Chinese Han-class submarine intruded into territorial waters claimed 
by Japan, the Ishigaki Strait, which caused Japan to think that China was showing off its 
military capabilities in efforts to provoke a response from the Japanese.232 Japan wanted 
China to announce the submarine’s intentions prior to the transit to offer some 
transparency to the situation. China’s official response regarding this event claimed the 
submarine traveled through the area because a technical error caused the poor navigation. 
Japan’s ASW capabilities had not been tested by China before this incident, and Japan 
was able to track the vessel for two days using its P-3 aircraft, ASW destroyers, and its 
helicopters, which proved the value of Japan’s ASW capabilities.233 When these types of 
ASW assets are used effectively, continually updating submarine tracking information, 
and relaying that data to the next asset, submarines have a difficult time eluding its 
opponent. These unpredictable events have the capacity to escalate any situation into a 
hostile environment, which creates an unstable region. 
The second maritime area of dispute between Japan and China concerns EEZs. 
These nautical areas begin at the coast and extend out to 200 nautical miles, according to 
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UNCLOS Articles 55 and 56. Within this area, states have the right over the economic 
use of fish and mineral resources.234 Figure 3 shows that the two states have overlapping 
EEZs, which is another source of contention because neither state wants to concede the 
natural resources to the other. In an attempt to challenge each other, both Japan and 
China have patrolled the areas more frequently, specifically near the disputed islands. 
Christopher W. Hughes argues in International Affairs that China has frequently 
launched “research ships” and warships into Japan’s EEZ near the disputed islands, and 
these actions are deemed as aggressive in intent. He further states that China has also 
been conducting undersea gas exploration near Japan’s EEZ, that have promoted 
Japanese fears that China would draw gas from Japan’s side of the EEZ.235  
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Figure 3.  Overlapping EEZs 
 
Source: J. R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (New York: 
Methuen & Co., 1986), 38.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Japan and China, two of the most capable and prominent players in the region, 
have been affected with a historical problem and each desires to maintain its freedom and 
sovereignty. These two nations will never agree on a common viewpoint on the past 
because each government portrays a specific narrative to its population. This portrayal 
creates tension that does not have a remedy and spills over to current issues. 
Japan, in response to China’s rising military, understands that its constitution will 
not allow the JMSDF to have all necessary pieces to have a complete warfighting 
package. Since Japan understands its military limits, it takes a dual approach to the rise of 
China through both hard and soft hedging, which could create greater stability. 
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Nevertheless, it possesses a considerable force to counter the PLAN and its submarines. 
Japan’s military enhancements in the ASW realm, a direct result of China’s military 
modernization, allow the JMSDF to monitor the PLAN better, and early detection can 
potentially prevent a confrontation. Japan must also rely on its alliance with the United 
State for its broader security. However, China’s military rise may cause Japan to desire to 
play a larger role in the alliance, which is discussed further in the next chapter. This 
analysis reveals that the PLAN’s submarines seem to be tools to advance China’s 
economic security rather than just to exert military power. As China advances its 
economic security, the intentions for its submarines are not fully known, and this 
uncertainty may cause Japan to overreact in efforts to protect itself, causing a security 
dilemma to spiral.  
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V. UNITED STATES’ VIEWS ON CHINESE SUBMARINE 
MODERNIZATION 
The rise of China is a cause of concern to the United States because history has 
shown that rising powers are prone to create conflict. Thucydides identified this concern 
when he claimed that a rising Athens led to the Peloponnesian War due to fear that was 
created in Sparta.236 China has recently been re-emerging as a world power, but after 
about 150 years of maintaining a weak profile.237 Both China and the United States 
should proceed cautiously with future endeavors, as they both have interests in avoiding 
conflicts that might weaken them. China’s military and economy are growing, but 
because of the complexity of international relations, its state is intertwined with many 
nations, including the United States, which requires U.S. cooperation. Even though the 
United States has economic incentives to cooperate with China, the PLAN’s submarine 
modernization has caused it to shift its foreign policy attention to the Pacific region. 
Beginning in 2012, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the 
U.S. Navy would shift its assets, and by 2020, 60% would be focused on the Pacific 
region, while 40% would focus on the Atlantic region.238 The United States has broader 
interests in promoting a multifaceted approach to create a region of stability. This chapter 
first discusses divergent security concerns that have created distrust between China and 
the United States. Second, it analyzes the threats that the PLAN’s submarine 
modernization present to the U.S. military.  
A. DIVERGENT SECURITY CONCERNS 
To understand how China views its relations with other nations. and what drives 
its security concerns, it is vital to look at its history, which has shaped its current 
thinking. The Chinese culture is one of the oldest cultures today, and tends to analyze its 
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past to prevent future mistakes by detailing a historical memory. Zheng Wang defines 
historical memory as, “the Chinese people’s collective historical consciousness about the 
country’s traumatic national experiences.”239 The culture has not forgotten what has 
happened to the nation, and this narrative of a century of humiliation is a key component 
to today’s Chinese national interests. In the mid-19th century, Western powers forced 
open China’s door with gunboats.240 Internal turmoil and foreign aggression gradually 
turned China, which was once a strong nation, into a subjugated and semi-colonial 
society. The country became poor and weak, and the people suffered from wars and 
chaos. From these events grew frustration, and following World War II, China was 
poised for revolution, never forgetting what had happened. Since the war, the United 
States has created several alliances that have created a security concern for China. This 
section first reviews the alliances that cause concern for China, and then it discusses three 
specific incidents that further shape the Chinese views of the west. 
1. U.S. Alliances 
The U.S.’ alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, are a source 
of contention with China. China, a stance opponent of alliances, believes that these 
agreements are not conducive for security. Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin 
delivered a speech in which he stressed the importance of an independent foreign policy 
to achieve peace.241 The United States, on the other hand, values foreign policy through 
alliances as a way to strengthen support for democracy and freedom. As China witnesses 
the United States maintaining its alliances, as well as creating policies that pivot to the 
east, China will continue to have concerns. One concern that has surfaced among Chinese 
analysts is that the United States is attempting to contain China.242 This concern has 
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increased as the United States enters into security relationships with other nations in the 
region, such as the Philippines and Singapore.243 The growing security concern of China 
will not improve, but could further implicate the security of the region. The United States 
must reassure China that it welcomes China as a growing power while still maintaining a 
defensive posture. 
2. Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia 
A recent incident drove a wedge further between the United States and China, as 
evident during the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia, in 1999. The U.S. Air Force had been performing bombing missions to 
pressure Yugoslavia to stop persecuting Albanians in Kosovo. However, on May 7, an 
American B-52 bomber accidentally targeted the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese and injuring 20.244 This incident led to protests in 
China and damaged relations between the two nations. Many Chinese believe that the 
bombing was intentional and that an accident could not have occurred because of the 
advanced technologies of the United States245 Leaders of the CCP spread anti-American 
rhetoric following this event. Li Peng, the second highest member of the CCP in 1999 
stated, “This incident, more than anything else, reminds us that the United States is an 
enemy. It is by no means a friend, as some say.” Li Lanqing, another top-ranking official 
of the CCP also stated, “The United States has always raised the banner of upholding 
world peace and protecting human rights and equality, yet it has used military force to 
conduct interference and persecution and to compel other countries to submit.”246 After 
this incident, Sino-U.S. relations had an underlying tone of suspicion, with the two states 
never fully gaining each other’s trust. To this day, the leadership of both states recognizes 
that a trust deficit exists, but military actions on both sides fail to reduce this deficit. 
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3. EP-3 Aircraft Incident 
Several years after the embassy incident, an American EP-3 aircraft collided with 
a Chinese F-8 fighter jet over international waters. This collision caused the American 
aircraft to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island and the loss of the Chinese pilot 
at sea.247 This event increased the trust deficit even more. China claims that the U.S. 
aircraft interfered with Chinese radio communications, while the U.S. reports the EP-3 
aircraft performed a routine operation, no different from what it had performed in the 
past.248 Throughout the incident, the United States maintained a neutral position, while 
China persisted that it was a victim and demanded an apology from the United States.249 
The Wall Street Journal reported, “China’s international legal obligations require it to 
honor other countries’ freedom of movement outside that 12-mile zone, but Beijing has 
tried to ban foreign militaries from conducting surveillance within its 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone as well.”250 China views the United States as intruding into its space, and 
because of its past, will not allow its state to be a victim, which seems to be causing it to 
act more aggressive. 
4. USNS Impeccable Incident 
The third incident between the United States and China occurred in 2009. The 
USNS Impeccable, an ocean surveillance ship, was conducting legal military activities in 
China’s EEZ. China took aggressive action because of a different interpretation of 
international laws, and sent five vessels to the same area to harass the USNS ship. China 
believes that a nation should be able to exercise greater control in its own EEZ; however, 
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this interpretation has no basis in international law.251 The Chinese vessels maneuvered 
close to the USNS Impeccable, and eventually stopped directly in front of it, causing the 
Impeccable to execute an emergency stop.252 China is demonstrating that it will not 
tolerate any type of actions that it deems unacceptable even though the actions may be 
legal in the international system. The United States should continue to exercise its rights 
in international waters to demonstrate that it will not accept aggressive behavior. 
B. U.S. RESPONSE TO CHINESE SUBMARINE MODERNIZATION 
The Obama administration in fall of 2011 announced that it would intensify its 
presence in East Asia through its foreign policy known as the “pivot” and then later the 
“rebalance” to Asia. This policy did not shift the goals for the region, but merely shifted 
the means with which to achieve the same goals. One goal, outlined in the U.S. strategic 
guidance document Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century 
Defense, is for the United States to project power in areas where U.S. access may be 
denied, such as the maritime regions of East Asia.253 China’s military modernization has 
the capability to challenge the U.S. military, and the Obama administration has decided 
that action has a greater benefit than inaction in the region. This section analyzes why the 
Obama administration initiated a shift in foreign policy to East Asia, and what the United 
States has done to bolster its capabilities in the region. 
1. Threat Perceptions Seen from the United States 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, China argues that Taiwan cannot be separated 
from China, because they are one, and the United States should not have interfered in this 
civil war in 1950 by siding with Taiwan.254 China saw this act as interference into its 
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internal affairs and the United States is responsible for creating stumbling blocks in the 
Sino-U.S. relations.255 The United States sees a potential threat in China with the ability 
to jeopardize the securities of the people of Taiwan through China’s ability to execute 
A2/AD in the Taiwan Straits. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., president of the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, argues that the PLAN has bolstered its capabilities 
“with the express goal of making the western Pacific a no-go zone for the U.S. 
military.”256 
2. Hard Hedging 
The DOD is challenged to provide for the freedom of navigation for its forces and 
its allies. However, the Chinese military has the potential to deny the United States the 
ability to navigate in the maritime domain, and this strategy is known A2/AD. The U.S. 
Air-Sea Battle Concept defines this strategy as capabilities that “challenge and threaten 
the ability of U.S. and allied forces to both get to the fight and to fight effectively once 
there.”257 Submarines play a role in the A2/AD concept by denying a force adequate 
freedom of navigation.258 As the PLAN increases its A2/AD capabilities through its 
submarine modernization, the ability of the United States  to uphold its regional security 
guarantees may be doubted. The United States acknowledges the Chinese build-up when 
it states in its report to Congress that the “military’s continued emphasis on developing 
anti-access/area denial capabilities makes clear that China seeks the capability to limit the 
U.S. military’s freedom of movement in the Western Pacific.”259 This emphasis has 
several implications, which is why the United States has had to adjust its military 
policies. 
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The United States needed a concept that accomplished several goals. The first was 
to identify the specific threat and the second was to reassure its allies and regional 
partners that the United States is a credible military partner. By drafting the Air-Sea 
Battle Concept, the United States identified that any force that attempts to deny the 
international community access to international waters is a threat and it will not retreat or 
submit to that force.260 The United States responded to this threat by bolstering the U.S. 
undersea warfare presence in the region through air assets, surface assets, and subsurface 
assets. Regarding ASW, former U.S. Navy 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Robert 
L. Thomas, argues, “Anti-submarine warfare is one of the most challenging yet critical 
tasks that our navies exercise. It takes a strong combined body of talented people and a 
cooperative plan to work together to achieve our full potential in ASW capabilities.”261 A 
key component of ASW is the helicopter squadrons. Helicopter Maritime Strike 
Squadron 77 (HSM-77) was establish in 1987 at Naval Air Station North Island in San 
Diego.262 This squadron originally flew the SH-60B helicopter, but transitioned to the 
MH-60R helicopter. The new version of this helicopter is critical for maritime 
dominance, and remains the only organic airborne anti-submarine warfare asset within 
strike groups that also deploys independently on warships.263 In 2012, the same year the 
Air-Sea Battle Concept was released, the U.S. Navy permanently moved HSM-77 from 
San Diego to Atsugi, Japan, as part of the rebalancing to the region.  
In addition to moving more ASW helicopters to the region, in 2013, the U.S. 
Navy also began to deploy its new P-8A Poseidon aircraft. The P-8A is an advanced anti-
submarine and reconnaissance aircraft.264 Patrol Squadron 5 (VP-5) completed its first 
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deployment with the P-8 aircraft, and it operated out of Okinawa, Japan, as well as the 
Philippines. During the deployment, the squadron completed over 350 missions and flew 
3,600 hours.265 After seven months, VP-45 and their six P-8 aircraft relieved VP-5. VP-
45 also operated out of Okinawa, Japan.266 The P-8A working in conjunction with the 
MH-60R creates one of the world’s most elite anti-submarine tandems. The Navy needed 
its most advanced assets in this contested area to legitimize its battle concept and to prove 
to its allies that the United States will stand by its commitment to the region by sustaining 
security in the international arena. 
The United States also strengthened its ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
capabilities in addition to its undersea warfare elements. The BMD element of the Air-
Sea Battle Concept provides credibility to the United States that its allies will be 
protected from a missile threat. The U.S. Navy’s BMD ships use the AEGIS system that 
provides a responsive missile defense capability.267 USS Benfold (DDG-65), USS Barry 
(DDG-52), USS Milius (DDG-69), and USS Chancellorsville (CG-62), will perform a 
homeport shift to Japan, while only the USS Lassen (DDG-82) will shift to back to the 
United States.268 These four ships have all been upgraded with the newest AEGIS 
equipment and will be a part of the Yokosuka Forward Deployed Naval Forces 
(FDNF).269  
The United States also moved more of its submarine assets to bolster the region. 
The USS Topeka (SSN 754) shifted its homeport to Guam in 2015. An additional 
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submarine in the region reinforces the capabilities of the United States to partner 
nations.270 
C. CONCLUSION 
The United States has an obligation to maintain freedom of the seas. The PLAN 
has demonstrated assertive behavior in the region, and its submarine modernization could 
allow for greater anxiety in the region. In response, the United States has shifted its 
forces and adjusted policies because of the PLAN’s increased military capacity. These 
two powers will not see security situations in the same light, and to prevent a security 
dilemma, both states seek ways to alleviate tensions in the region.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
As India, Japan, and the United States move forward in a complex and 
interconnected world, their thinking and strategies with regard to China must be carefully 
planned. Chinese leaders do not think or see problem sets the same way the other states’ 
leaders do. As China and the United States both desire to maintain their military 
superiority in East Asia, they also should find areas to cooperate to foster some trust that 
may improve their relationship. In the meantime, the United States and its allies should 
continue to have a balanced approach concerning China. This section discusses hard-
hedging recommendations followed by soft-hedging recommendations. 
A. U.S. HARD HEDGING  
If the United States wants to prevent China from accomplishing A2/AD, it must 
have some options that would counter the tactic. The United States has several options, 
and two options could limit an arms race, which would also be cost efficient. The first is 
for the United States to invest in SSK submarines. The U.S. Navy’s submarine inventory 
consists of only nuclear-powered submarines, which are costly compared to an SSK 
submarine. The Virginia-Class (SSN), which began commissioning in 2004, costs 
approximately $2 billion per submarine.271 Meanwhile, Vietnam signed a deal to acquire 
six SSKs from Russia for roughly the same price.272 If the United States had a small fleet 
of SSKs in this region, it would allow it to patrol larger areas, and possibly, disrupt the 
PLAN’s operations. This fleet could patrol key egress points, as well as major ports 
offering the capability to intercept the enemy quickly and confusing enemy planning and 
operations.273 These submarines should be equipped with AIP technology that would 
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enhance the undersea operations of the United States in a cost effective manner. These 
submarines would also potentially demonstrate to China that the United States would not 
want to compete in an arms race, but rather would like to see tensions de-escalate in the 
region. Further research should be accomplished to detail fully the cost associated with 
the logistics of a SSK fleet. 
A second option for the United States is to consider a military alliance with India. 
Both states have similar regional interests, and this relationship could benefit both sides. 
Indian Prime Minister Modi suggests that the future relationship between these two 
countries has the potential for a greater capacity when he states, “India and the United 
States of America are bound together, by history and by culture. These ties will deepen 
further.”274 One aspect of this alliance should be for the United States to promote SSK 
support to India, as demonstrating to China that  it is not interested in an arms race. This 
alliance and the creation of a SSK fleet for the United States should be further examined 
to provide the United States options. 
B. U.S. AND JAPAN HARD HEDGING 
While India and the United States have never had an alliance, the United States 
and Japan have had an alliance since 1951. As the United States has had it policies 
“rebalance” to Asia, the U.S.-Japan Alliance should also be rebalanced. The alliance 
should be examined to further assess situations in which the JMSDF could increase its 
participation. One way is for the United States and the JMSDF to participate in bilateral 
maritime patrols. The JMSDF participates in joint training and exercises, but they do not 
conduct actual joint missions.275 Japanese Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, chief of the Joint 
Staff of the JSDF, states that China’s actions in the China Seas causes serious concerns 
for his forces and he believes that the United States and the JMSDF should consider 
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performing joint missions.276 These missions should be joint patrols of the South China 
Sea that would allow Japan to contribute to the protection of freedom of navigation.277 
These joint operations would demonstrate to China that more ASW assets are cooperating 
that could complicate its A2/AD plans and operations. 
Another option would be for the JMSDF to procure a more robust SSK fleet. This 
fleet could either cooperate with the suggested U.S. SSK fleet or be a substitute option. 
The JMSDF is slated to be composed of only 22 submarines; this fleet could be two or 
three times as large to aid the undersea domain better.  
C. INDIA HARD HEDGING 
The IN has spent a considerable amount of energy and money funding its first 
SSN and SSBN. If India is worried that the PLAN’s submarines will continue to operate 
in or near the Indian Ocean, preventing India the freedom of the seas, then the IN should 
invest in more SSKs by utilizing AIP technology. If the IN flooded the waters with a SSK 
fleet, it could have a constant presence and awareness of all operations occurring in the 
Indian Ocean. The PLAN would then realize the IN may not have the capacity to 
challenge the PLAN directly, but would be countering the PLAN. 
D. SOFT HEDGING 
The United States, India, and Japan should not only focus on military tactics and 
operations to counter the PLAN, they also need to improve dialogue among states to 
minimize misunderstandings and to understand intentions better. One way to improve this 
dialogue is to invite the PLAN to act as an observer for military exercises with the future 
option of becoming an active participant. In October 2015, the United States, India, and 
Japan all participated in Exercise MALABAR in the Bay of Bengal.278 While this 
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exercise has value for the three states, it raised concerns for China and the PLAN. China 
may see this exercise as a way to contain the PLAN. By inviting China to act an observer, 
dialogue could increase regarding maritime issues and military intentions. The United 
States may also request to be an observer during Sino-Russian naval exercises as quid pro 
quo.  
In addition to this exercise, the United States should increase its own bilateral 
military exercises with the PLAN to demonstrate that cooperation is possible. The United 
States and the PLAN have broken ground in this area, when the PLAN participated in 
RIMPAC 2014, and then in 2015, when PLAN ships made port calls to the Broadway 
Pier in San Diego and to Naval Station Mayport in Florida. These port calls were an 
initiative by both China and U.S. leaders to begin more military collaboration.279 
However, some members of Congress are skeptical about military exercises with China. 
Congressman J. Randy Forbes wrote a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, in which 
he voices his concerns that military cooperation has benefitted China, while the Chinese 
military continues with aggressive actions against the United States.280 Even though the 
United States has not seen immediate results from military exercises, it should continue 
to include China; otherwise, a relationship will never take root, in an effort to build 
partner capacity. China and the United States should create an annual maritime military 
event, to include exercises and forums, to foster some type of trust. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Chinese submarine modernization has caused India, Japan, and the United States 
to react. The PLAN has increased submarine operations in the region, and with its 
continued modernization, the maritime domain will likely see an increased frequency of 
submarine encounters. The three hypothesis presented in this thesis seem to all hold true 
depending on the viewpoint. The first two hypotheses have been proven through India’s 
viewpoint. India first perceives the PLAN as threatening and destabilizing. India chose to 
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respond with the acquisition of a SSBN because of a perceived threat, potentially creating 
an arms race. India desires to be the dominant power in its region, but its capabilities lag 
behind the PLAN. To achieve the goal of security in the Indian Ocean, the IN had to 
acquire a SSBN to challenge the perceived threat. Secondly, India does view that the 
PLAN possesses the capacity to disrupt SLOCs, and India chose to respond by increasing 
its own ASW capabilities with its SSN. India’s hard hedging may outweigh any type of 
soft hedging that has been accomplished.  
While looking from Japan’s viewpoint, all three hypotheses hold true. Japan does 
see the PLAN’s modernization as threatening and destabilizing. Tensions have already 
increased because of the PLAN’s use of submarines, and Japan has acquired a force to 
counter the PLAN. Regardless of the soft hedging or hard hedging performed by Japan, 
their tumultuous history seems to weigh heavy on the relationship. Time may be the best 
treatment, with the hopes that future generations may have the ability to negotiate 
peaceful cooperation. 
As for the United States, the fear of the possibility to disrupt the balance of power 
seems to be the cause of concern. The first hypothesis does hold true for the United 
States; the modernization of the PLAN could threaten to prevent it from accomplishing 
its missions. The United States would like to maintain stability in the world’s oceans, and 
with the CCP in power, the military’s intentions are not always clear. Neither one of 
these super powers would benefit from a military conflict, nor would the region. 
Continued open dialogue between these states must occur.  
As China attempts to shift the balance of power in its favor through submarine 
modernization in these seas and disputed regions, India, Japan, and the United States can 
create a balanced approach that could prevent a conflict from occurring. These states 
have a deeply intertwined history, and because of the varying viewpoints, the current 
leaders may never come to any consensus. However, even though the states may never 
fully agree, they can manage expectations. One expectation should be the desire to avoid 
military conflict and the incentives, including economic relationships, and regional 
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